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Abstract 
 
Research suggests that context matters for MNEs’ international business strategy. MNEs’ 
strategies vary when different intertwined contexts interact with each other. While 
International Business scholars understand well the influence of the institutional 
environments on firms’ international strategies and operations, some contextual differences 
are less understood as is the case involving African countries and firms. In this study I 
investigate how different institutional contexts and legitimacy challenges combine to 
impact ownership strategic choices of African firms in their cross-border acquisitions 
(CBAs).  Specifically, I study the influence of the host country institutional development 
and two institutional dimension distances: administrative distance and knowledge distance. 
Methodologically, I use a sample of 314 CBAs made by acquirers from 24 African 
countries in 71 host countries worldwide to test a number of theoretically driven 
hypotheses. This study contributes to our understanding of how foreign investors from less 
institutionally developed countries that are more likely to face higher legitimacy barriers 
use ownership strategies to achieve legitimacy abroad. 
 
Keywords: African acquisitions; African institutional environment; African 
multinationals; Cross-border acquisitions; Ownership. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Firms entering foreign markets have to make decisions pertaining to the 
ownership of their foreign operations. The ownership stake is an important strategic 
decision because it determines firms’ degree of control, resource commitment, and risks 
over their operations in a foreign host country (Laufs & Schwens, 2014). Despite the 
importance of ownership, both given the long term implications and also the short term 
disbursement of financial resources it entails, there are still some gaps in the existing 
knowledge as put by Ando (2012, p. 260) “not much is known about the effect of 
institutional dissimilarity on the choice of ownership structure of foreign subsidiaries”. 
Moreover, our understanding is still rather limited in understanding how multinational 
corporations from extremely institutionally underdeveloped countries are able to 
overcome what could be unsurmountable issues pertaining to the lack of legitimacy. 
This lack of legitimacy is even more likely to be majored when entering the more 
developed countries of Europe and the US. 
Africa presents an institutionally underdeveloped environment that may magnify 
the challenges faced by MNEs for achieving legitimacy in their international expansion. 
Legitimacy is achieved when MNEs’ actions and activities are generally perceived by 
the environment as desirable and appropriate (Suchman, 1995, Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999; Human & Provan, 2000). Host countries have their own standards in judging 
MNEs behavior, which are usually different from those applied to domestic firms 
during the legitimating process (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The African continent is 
known from suffering from political instability, corruption, poverty and ongoing 
conflicts within and across many countries borders (Mol, Stadler & Ariño, 2016). 
Hence, African multinationals (AfMNEs) are likely to be perceived pejoratively by 
potential business partners abroad. AfMNEs might be seen in the host country as firms 
that lack proper requirements in order to bring value to a business relationship, for 
lacking technology and an overall sense of distrust which is likely due, at least to some 
extent, to the reflection of the many economic, political and corruption problems across 
the African continent. That is, the reality that AfMNEs face at home might raise 
legitimacy problems when entering foreign countries and especially more developed 
countries.  
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The extent of the host country institutional pressures over AfMNEs vary 
according to the perceived cross-country institutional differences (Berry, Guillén & 
Zhou, 2010) and the level of institutional development of the host country (Hernández 
& Nieto, 2015; Meyer, Ding, Li & Zhang, 2014). Cross-country differences at the 
regulatory domain, for instance, require additional efforts to attain local legitimacy 
because AfMNEs must comply with unfamiliar legal frameworks and market practices. 
Moreover, significant cross-country differences regarding technology and know-how 
can raise fears in the host country of losing technological preponderance or competitive 
advantages (Meyer et al., 2014). These institutional pressures, as I will advance, are 
probably moderated by the level of institutional development of the host country 
because of the institutional voids that “affect entry mode choice as underdeveloped 
institutions drive the costs of establishing wholly-owned ventures” (Meyer, 2001, p. 
365).  
Ownership strategies enhance AfMNEs’ ability to successfully deal with the host 
country institutional pressures (Delios & Henisz, 2000). How ownership strategies help 
African firms cope with their legitimacy challenges is a theme that deservers further 
research since “institutional pressures do not apply homogeneously to all foreign firms” 
(Meyer et al., 2014, p. 1007). In this study I consider the effect of the host country 
institutional development and two dimensions of institutional distance that were 
previously identified by Berry et al. (2010) – administrative distance and knowledge 
distance – to investigate how different ownership strategic choices allow parent firms 
coming from Africa to achieve legitimacy abroad. I will put forth the proposition that 
the ownership strategies are strategic responses to the institutional distance that 
separates the AfMNEs from the host countries where they are investing. To explore into 
the ownership I use a sample of cross-border acquisitions conducted by AfMNEs. 
That is, in essence, using a panel dataset consisting of 314 acquisitions made by 
acquirer firms from 24 African home countries in 71 host countries, from 2009 to 2015, 
I investigate how AfMNEs use ownership strategies to effectively deal with their 
legitimacy challenges abroad. Post-hoc analyses with specific subsamples add further 
theoretical and empirical insights.  
This study has thus four main contributions to the literature. First, when 
considering home and host environments MNEs are faced with, our understanding 
about the relationship between the presence or absence of institutional voids and the 
distance between more specific institutional dimensions is still scarce. I argue that 
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integrating between the concept of institutional distance and the concept of legitimacy – 
“as the acceptance of the organization by its environment [is] vital for organizational 
survival and success” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, p. 64) – permits improving our 
understanding of the MNEs’ strategic choices when embracing international business 
activities. 
Second, this study highlights the potential moderator effect of the level of host 
country institutional development over institutional distance in MNEs’ ownership 
choices. More specifically, I put forth that gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy 
requires different strategies in institutionally developed countries than those best suited 
for underdeveloped countries (Suchman, 1995). Institutionally developed environments 
present more market friendly regulations and practices which, coupled with higher 
levels of legal investors’ protection, enable MNEs to easily overcome their liability of 
foreignness. However, more developed countries are also more likely to look with 
suspicion to AfMNEs. 
A third contribution arises from enhancing our understanding over the African 
continent and the AfMNEs’ strategic behaviors. I am thus able to provide insights on 
how the nature of the institutional environment drives AfMNEs strategies. In this regard 
it is useful to examine whether and how the ownership choices of AfMNEs may vary 
when investing in other African countries and when investing out of Africa. 
A final contribution to the debate on institutional legitimacy. In fact, AfMNEs are 
more likely to have much greater obstacles to their legitimacy in the foreign expansions. 
Indeed these obstacles may be even greater by expanding through cross-border 
acquisitions in more institutionally developed countries. How these a priori illegitimate 
AfMNEs are able to gain legitimacy is an endeavor worth researching even for its 
implications to a wider variety of countries such as those in Latin America and even the 
poorer countries in Asia. 
The study is organized in seven parts as follows. The next part addresses the 
literature review over the relevant themes under analysis: (1) ownership in CBAs; (2) 
institutional differences across countries; and (3) gaining legitimacy in foreign 
countries. The third part proceeds with the development of hypotheses. The method, in 
the fourth part, includes presentation of the data, sample and variables. The fifth part 
shows the results of the tests of the hypotheses. The sixth part entails a broad discussion 
of the results linking back to the theory. The dissertation concludes with an outline of 
final remarks. 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(This page was intentionally left blank) 
  
5 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Institutional theory addresses the processes by which structures become acting as 
guidelines for social behavior, supported by three “pillars” (regulative – laws, rules; 
normative – norms; and cognitive – cultures, ethics), and examining interactions from 
micro interpersonal to macro global frameworks (Scott, 2004). Institutions are 
commonly known as the “rules of the game”, whether formal (laws, rules and 
regulations) or informal (norms, cultures and ethics), placing constraints to human 
interaction and shaping competition (Peng, Sun, Pinkham & Chen, 2009). Accordingly, 
firms are subjected to a set of pressures for compliance with their host environments. 
Institutional dissimilarities emerge from a variety of national differences that each 
different host country might present to a given MNE when considering to pursuit its 
business activities abroad (Ando, 2012). The strength of the institutional pressures 
presented by the host country is a determinant of the costs of doing business abroad 
(Chan, Isobe & Makino, 2008). 
Strong or weak institutional settings present different challenges for MNEs 
success. Well-developed institutional environments are those that are stable, credible 
and fostering of market supporting activities (Peng, 2002; Hernández & Nieto, 2015), 
making it less costly for MNEs to engage in business activities. Less developed,  or 
weak, institutional environments are those where deploying non-market capabilities 
enhance MNEs’ competitive advantages, such as lobbying and government 
relationships (Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen & Nielsen, 2016), and make market transactions 
costly, whether because transformation is less efficient and/or  MNEs need to protect 
their assets from expropriation hazards (Chan et al., 2008; Delios & Henisz, 2000).  
Cross-country institutional distances inhibit MNEs from achieving legitimacy 
across borders and influence MNEs ownership choices (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). These 
distances pose hurdles that might be magnified by the existence of institutional voids in 
the host country. For successfully doing business abroad, MNEs must rely on their 
ability to overcome institutional differences between their home and host countries, 
while seeking to understand how to obtain legitimacy for their international activities 
(Meyer et al., 2014). Delios and Henisz (2000) emphasized that ownership is one 
strategic option that allows MNEs to cope with their institutional environment. 
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2.1 Ownership in CBAs  
MNEs can achieve legitimacy by using ownership strategies; albeit the 
effectiveness of ownership strategies may also vary according to the magnitude of the 
institutional pressures exerted by the host country (Meyer et al., 2014). Focusing in a 
particular type of MNE – MNEs that had some degree of government ownership, Meyer 
et al. (2014) outlined how the idiosyncrasies of state-owned MNEs (versus privately 
held firms) lead to different legitimating pressures exerted by the host country agents 
over the firm. These authors explain that “institutional pressures do not apply 
homogeneously to all foreign firms” (Meyer et al., 2014, p. 1007) and that those 
pressures might be quite significant when entering technologically and institutionally 
advanced countries. Equity mode control emerges as a way for managing the magnitude 
of those pressures and thus the extension of the legitimacy challenges that MNEs will 
face in the host country (Meyer et al., 2014; Delios & Henisz, 2000). 
MNEs might aim at getting involved in a partnership for overcoming their 
legitimacy challenges abroad, but differences between countries may inhibit their 
endeavors. Cross-country differences in regulatory environments, such as differences 
between free market economies and centrally directed economies, eventually raise 
distrust among host country legitimating actors regarding the MNE intentions and 
capabilities (Meyer et al., 2014). In a similar vein, host country’s agents in more 
technologically developed countries may raise fears regarding the possibility of 
technological leakage to foreign MNEs (Meyer et al., 2014). When an AfMNE engages 
in a CBA in a technologically advanced country it likely faces higher institutional 
pressures hindering the achievement of legitimacy than those that might be posed to 
another foreign MNE coming from a technologically advanced country. In this instance, 
for an AfMNE engaging in a CBA, legitimacy pressures might loom for conditioning 
the firm’s choices over the desirable level of equity control of the venture. MNEs might 
need to sacrifice ownership in exchange for legitimacy since lower levels of ownership 
help controlling adverse reactions from host country legitimating actors (Meyer et al., 
2014) while enhancing its local identity and legitimacy. 
The literature offers several studies over MNEs preferences for partial or full 
ownership but has been less explicit on how ownership may be a legitimacy creating 
strategy. Full ownership tends to be sought when acquirers identify greater needs of 
controlling its subsidiary operations, such as in situations when there is a substantial 
MNE’s resource commitment and managers’ perception of the risks involved is high 
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(Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Chari & Chang, 2009; Kedia & Bilgili, 2015). The acquirers seek 
complete control over the operations in order to offset the risks involved and the 
liability of foreignness. Conversely, Dikova (2009, p.41) argued that “ownership 
strategy is a useful tool in reducing unfamiliarity hazards” and states that “shared 
ownership can reduce the costs associated with liability of foreignness or environmental 
uncertainty”. Partial ownership can also be explained under the real options theory 
approach. De Villa, Rajwani and Lawton (2015, p. 423) stated that “partial acquisitions 
provide a better combination of characteristics when the option to grow and the option 
to abandon are important”. When there are higher levels of country differences the 
involvement of host country partners may enable access to complementary resources 
while sharing risks, and providing the acquirer with the flexibility to increase its foreign 
country commitment or abandon endeavor at a lower cost (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Chari 
& Chang, 2009; Kedia & Bilgili, 2015). However, the choice for a partial ownership 
entails some costs because the acquirer firm will not be able to fully integrate the target, 
will have less control, and may be exposed to opportunistic behaviors by the local 
partners (Chari & Chang, 2009; Kedia & Bilgili, 2015). Hence, partial ownership helps 
achieving legitimacy abroad but often demands higher governance costs due to efforts 
monitoring and coordinating subsidiary operations (Delios & Henisz, 2000), while full 
ownership allows for greater operational control. 
The effect of institutional distance on the choice of ownership depends on MNEs’ 
goals for obtaining legitimacy and operational efficiency. Some authors suggest that 
higher levels of institutional distance between home and host countries likely lead to 
lower levels of equity sought  (Chari & Chang, 2009) because institutional distances 
between countries, such as a large cultural distance, will likely require the involvement 
of local partners in order to mobilize local legitimacy and offset foreign environment 
uncertainties (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Conversely, other authors stand that higher 
institutional distances present higher levels of risk and uncertainty inducing managers to 
choose higher ownership in order to improve the subsidiaries chances of survival (Gaur 
& Lu, 2007). Institutional distance raise external uncertainties and challenges requiring 
adjustments from the acquirer firm in order to obtain legitimacy in the host country 
because legitimacy “will allow for relatively easy transfer of technology, organizational 
practices, and other resources across organizations, making the entire acquisition 
process faster and less complicated” (Elango, Lahiri and Kundu, 2013, p. 5). 
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The direction of the institutional distance becomes crucial to enhance our 
understanding over how those differences apply regarding MNEs’ strategic choices (De 
Beule, Elia & Piscitello, 2014; Hernández & Nieto, 2015). Considering the regulatory 
development in the host country, Hernández and Nieto (2015) pose that MNEs facing 
higher developed environments are able to easily adapt as the distance grows because 
environments will present less uncertainty. Moreover, these actors consider that when 
the legitimacy criteria (which bears in the institutional theory) becomes easier to 
achieve abroad managers will resort to the efficiency criteria (which bears in the 
transaction costs theory) in order to draw their entry strategies in the foreign market. 
The somehow ambiguous results presented by the literature regarding the effects of 
institutional distance on equity ownership choices might be better explained when 
considering the level of institutional development of the host country. The level of 
institutional development in the host country directly affects MNEs strategic decision-
making (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng, 2009; Ando, 2012).  
Institutional development in the host country sets the direction of the CBA 
regarding how difficult it can be achieving legitimacy abroad. Institutional development 
can be seen as a coordination mechanism fostering uncertainty reduction (Meyer, 2001), 
providing meaning and setting behavior boundaries (Peng et al., 2009), and making it 
easier to achieve legitimacy in the host country. Peng (2003) explains that, in a given 
economy, as complexity increases – regarding scale, scope and specificity – more 
complex transactions and more transaction parties emerge as well. In this instance, 
regulatory institutional development looms to help economic agents coping easily with 
the environment idiosyncrasies. The author also highlights that these mechanisms do 
not occur always in the same direction. If institutionally the regulatory environment 
seems to be inadequate to fulfill the economic needs then the economic agents will 
resort to more informal relationships in order to pursue their business activities. MNEs 
will pursue personal or impersonal relationships abroad according to their own 
legitimacy needs (Peng, 2003). 
Overall, research evidences that institutions condition MNEs’ strategic options. 
Particularly, the degree of ownership chosen by MNEs is strategic because it bounds 
how the parent firm controls its resource base, exerts authority, promotes organizational 
changes, implements new processes, deals with connections in local context, and learns 
to adjust to unfamiliar political and legal (Elango et al., 2013; Li, Peng & Macaulay, 
2013), economic and cultural (Rugman et al., 2011) environments.  
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2.2 Institutional differences across countries  
Institutional distance and the level of the host country institutional development 
differ and interact. Institutional distance affects MNEs’ ability to achieve legitimacy 
abroad by hampering MNEs’ efforts to understand the foreign market (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999; Kostova et al., 2008). This difficulty will likely trigger local conflicting 
reactions which may jeopardize MNEs’ endeavors for both internal legitimacy 
(hindering subsidiary integration processes with parent firm such as the transfer of 
strategic routines) and external legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 
2002). However, regardless of managers’ institutional distance perceptions, the host 
country might provide a given set of conditions that may make it easier or hinder the 
acceptance of MNEs operations by the foreign constituencies. 
Research suggests two distinct and complementary approaches (Hernández & 
Nieto, 2015) to explain why the level of the host country institutional development 
interacts with the institutional distance perceptions when MNEs are drawing their 
international business strategies: (1) the transaction cost approach (Meyer, 2001); and 
(2) the strategic-legitimacy approach (Suchman, 1995). First, within the transaction cost 
approach, the existence of institutional voids – such as unclear regulatory frameworks, 
inexperienced bureaucracies, underdeveloped court systems, and institutional settings 
with corruption issues and weak property rights protection – increase transaction costs 
(Meyer, 2001; Chan et al., 2008; Abotsi & Iyavarakul, 2015). Hence, “institutional 
development affects entry mode choice as underdeveloped institutions drive the costs of 
establishing wholly-owned ventures” (Meyer, 2001, p. 365), regardless of institutional 
distance considerations. Institutional distance and institutional voids combine to inhibit 
MNEs from gaining legitimacy in the host country. 
Second, by the strategic-legitimacy approach, legitimacy can be depicted as an 
operational resource (Suchman, 1995) because MNEs may emerge themselves as their 
own legitimacy builder actors by manipulating environmental structures, and creating 
their own audiences and legitimacy beliefs through negotiations based in a dynamic that 
often bears on power relationships (Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008). When facing their 
institutional strategic choices to achieve legitimacy abroad MNEs may choose for 
compliance, cooptation or defiance attitudes (Peng, 2003) and these considerations 
likely have some degree of freedom in relation with the institutional distance analysis. 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999, p. 65) state that “it is possible for an MNE to be culturally 
adapted and still lack legitimacy in a particular environment”, which outlines that there 
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may not be a full correspondence between overcoming institutional distance and 
achieving legitimacy.  
The literature recognizes the influence of the normative and cognitive dimensions 
in the regulatory framework of any host country, which adds an additional element of 
complexity for understanding the encounter between entities coming from disparate 
origins. Countries that share the same language and the same religion often share 
institutional structures and business practices (Kedia & Bilgili, 2015). By the same 
token, when two countries share historical ties, either positive or negative, citizens 
possess greater knowledge of local laws and business practices (Kedia & Bilgili, 2015). 
France is an example of such instances since the country maintains “special 
relationships with former French colonies in Africa” which confers special trade access 
and a sense of proximity between countries (Brewer, 2007, p. 51). Even when that 
historical ties lead to increasing animosity between two countries, still that probably 
mean that home and host country’s citizens realize each other better compared with 
some other distant countries. This focus on what might bring cultures together (Shenkar, 
2001) helps understanding the perceptual nature of cross-country distances (Sousa & 
Lages, 2011) and, therefore, contributes to enhance our knowledge over MNEs entry 
mode choices.  
Knowledge differences across countries can also present another source of 
difficulties preventing MNEs from obtaining legitimacy. Berry et al. (2010) argue that 
assessing knowledge distance is important because proximity to knowledge influences 
firms’ location choices, while talent, innovation, and creativity vary across countries. 
Knowledge and innovation seem to be the two sides of the same coin. The numbers of 
patents and scientific articles by country have been used by the literature on national 
innovation systems to assess cross-national distances (Berry et al., 2010). Knowledge 
emerges as one determinant of the nature of business competition (Lu, Tsang & Peng, 
2008) thus constraining firms’ competitive advantage effectiveness. By sensing 
knowledge distance managers might perceive differences in infrastructure and factor 
market between home and host countries, which can be crucial for “adapting, 
integrating and reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, resources and 
functional competences to match the requirements of a changing environment” (Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen, 1997, p. 515). Knowledge distance can increase the uncertainty MNEs 
are dealing with when engaging in a CBA. For example, cross-country differences in 
labor skills may represent increasing operational costs due to renewed employees’ 
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training needs, which may also raise resistances hampering the process of integration 
between the parent firm and the subsidiary. Knowledge distance inhibits obtaining both 
internal legitimacy and external legitimacy (Lu et al., 2008; Meyer et al., 2014). 
 
2.3 Gaining legitimacy in foreign countries 
Differences between home and host countries institutional environments forces 
MNEs to assess the requirements demanded by host country’s agents to be considered a 
legitimate player. The heterogeneity of firm origins and capabilities leads host country’s 
main actors to rely on prior experiences, common standards and stereotypes to build 
their expectations upon the foreign firm engaging in a CBA (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
The encounter between home and host entities depends upon mutual perceptions, which 
likely evolve and change with the increasing interactions between the parties (Shenkar, 
2001), and allows MNEs to adapt strategies for gaining legitimacy abroad. 
The interactions between individuals, such as MNEs’ managers and host 
country’s government officials, influences MNEs strategies for obtaining legitimacy 
abroad and does not have necessarily to be exclusively dependent on cross-country 
differences. Escaping from the idea of “distance”, Shenkar, Luo and Yeheskel (2008, p. 
918) propose a “friction perspective” which calls attention to the actual contact between 
parties, “including its power and interest asymmetry”, and points out that overcoming 
environmental uncertainty depends upon how each participant understands and reacts to 
the interactions between them.  
Understanding the institutional effects on the ownership in CBAs requires a 
combined focus on both cross-country distances and host country requirements for 
granting legitimacy. The scope of cross-country distance embraces several dimensions 
(Berry et al., 2010). However, the influence that each of these dimensions exerts over 
MNEs ability to achieve legitimacy is quite disparate according to the relevant 
institutional context which, for instance, can be conditioned by the existence of trade 
agreements between countries (Brewer, 2007). Furthermore, the absence of legitimacy 
in an host country does not mean outright rejection and the results from the collision 
between the MNE and the legitimating actors abroad is dependent upon their mutual 
perceptions and interactions (Shenkar et al., 2008). Cross-national distance and 
legitimacy are two theoretical concepts important for MNEs when setting up their 
international business strategies. While both concepts relate to the firm needs to cope 
12 
 
with the uncertainties presented by the international business environment, research 
outlines important distinctions between these constructs that deserve to be mentioned.  
Psychic distance is a concept that has been widely studied and accepted as having 
impact for adequate market selection, entry mode choice (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 
Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; Brewer, 2007; Håkanson & Ambos, 2010), and suitable 
MNEs management strategies as well (Swoboda, Elsner & Olejnik, 2015; Rugman et 
al., 2011; Risberg, 2003). The concept comprehends the “factors that make it difficult to 
understand foreign environments” (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, p. 1412) such as 
“differences in language, education, business practices, culture and industrial 
development” (Johanson & Vahlne 1977, p. 24). Hence, “psychic distance” is a 
multidimensional construct challenging researchers over a widespread range of 
questions regarding how to apply it for enhancing international business understanding. 
The concept embraces the perception of geographic, cultural and institutional 
differences between home and foreign markets (Brewer, 2007), and comprehends 
country characteristics and people characteristics as well (Sousa & Lages, 2011; Dow & 
Karunaratna, 2006). As described in the Uppsala model (Johanson & Wiedersheim-
Paul, 1975; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) managers’ perception of distance between 
countries accounts for hurdling knowledge flows  and explains that difficult to get 
known markets are avoided ones (Brewer, 2007). This deterrent effect of institutional 
distance (Dow & Ferencikova, 2010) highlights that manager familiarity with the 
markets is a key element since managers “must intellectually understand and 
emotionally relate to conditions in foreign countries” (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010, p. 
198).  
Legitimacy, in turn, refers to where MNE’s actions and activities are seen as 
acceptable, proper and appropriate within the host countries environments (Human & 
Provan, 2000; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), and within the multinational structure 
(Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). When entering foreign markets both 
the MNE and the host country legitimating actors lack information about each other 
(Chari & Chang, 2009). This information asymmetry needs to be overcome at least as 
close as possible to the point where MNE’s actions and activities in the host country are 
allowed to pursue in a regular basis. The higher the information asymmetry between the 
MNE and its legitimating actors, the more the host country environment resorts to 
stereotypes and its own standards in judging MNEs behavior (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
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The host country often exhibits a bundle of social pressures over the MNEs legitimacy 
granting process.  
The literature highlights that MNEs need being able to identify the host country’s 
legitimating main actors in order to be successful. This capability enables firms to grab 
opportunities abroad spite the presence of some institutional distant factors, while 
avoiding low return-high risk country settings (Chan et al., 2008; Li et al., 2014). Chan 
et al. (2008), studying Japanese foreign affiliate performance in 38 host countries 
between 1996 and 2001, identify Indonesia, Thailand and China as countries with low 
return-high risk profile within the considered period. Regarding the institutional 
pressures firms face when engaging in international business ventures, Li et al. (2013) 
outline the example of Royal Dutch Shell entering Eastern Russia through obtaining a 
55% stake in the Sakhalin oil fields without duly safeguarding the risks involved in the 
operation. Later on, due to its inability to manage the relationships with the government 
and other local stakeholders, the company was forced to abandon its investment by 
selling its shares under market prices (Li et al., 2013). To be successful, MNEs need to 
identify the host country’s legitimating constituencies for assessing the appropriate 
ownership strategy.  
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3. Hypotheses 
 
African countries present a very idiosyncratic institutional context influencing 
AfMNEs’ ownership strategies across borders. Legitimacy challenges faced by 
AfMNEs engaged in a CBA seem to be exacerbated by their home underdeveloped 
institutional environments. Particularly, regarding the regulatory and technological 
distances to host countries in advanced economies (Meyer et al., 2014), AfMNEs’ 
ownership choices might act as an important tool to successfully overcome these 
legitimacy challenges.  
AfMNEs face several administrative idiosyncrasies that may raise difficulties for 
achieving legitimacy abroad. Africa is a very special continent regarding ethnic and 
linguistic variety, which acts as a source of separation between cultures. Before the 
colonial era up to ten thousand different autonomous groups were living by their own 
customs; and today over two thousand recognized languages still remain actively 
spoken (George, Corbishley, Haas & Tihanyi, 2016). Therefore, disparate tribal 
identities and cultures create accrued difficulties for any effort of formal institutional 
building, and distrust is often present among the members of an African organization. 
George et al. (2016) refer that MNEs need to deal effectively within “communities of 
place” and adopt regional “lingua francas” such, as Swahili, in order to establish local 
legitimacy. Moreover, the variety of legal influences the continent has received from the 
colonial countries, such as British common law and French civil law, sets a potential of 
heterogeneous legal frameworks among the African countries. Thus, even when 
performing a CBA inside Africa it is likely that AfMNEs are still facing administrative 
distant environments.  
Also, Africa is a continent at a huge disadvantage on technology and know-how 
issues compared to worldwide developed countries. In general, Africa unbalances 
regarding technology and know-how considerations can be illustrated as follows: the 
continent lacks human capital due to paucity in educated people, only 2% of academic 
research authors are in Africa, and 70% of all top-ranked African enterprises by turn-
over and profits are originating from South Africa (George et al., 2016). With the 
possible exception of South Africa enterprises, this reality prompts a huge distance 
between AfMNEs’ home countries and the large majority of the developed countries 
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where a potential CBA can be engaged by an African firm. AfMNEs’ managers may 
lack educational training to compete globally (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev & Peng, 
2013) and the firms may lack absorptive capacity to deal effectively with the new 
information and know-how they may be gathering. Weigelt and Miller (2013) state that 
the multiplicity of knowledge sets and their interrelatedness results in a task complexity 
that requires a given firm’s internal infrastructure to properly manage the knowledge 
flows. Therefore, African countries are at a struggling position for competing with firms 
from advanced economies. 
Although the recognized importance of institutional distances, not all institutional 
dimensions present the same relevance during a CBA process. An in depth analysis of 
these two cross-country distances – administrative  distance and knowledge distance – 
seems to be more meaningful for understanding AfMNEs efforts to achieve legitimacy 
abroad than looking at other dimensions, such as economic distance, political distance 
or financial distance. The literature outlines that these two cross-country distances 
usually raise the first barriers for an MNE that wishes to gain legitimacy abroad (Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002; Meyer et al., 2014). The regulative distance is the most relevant 
dimension in the initial phase of the international expansion because it sets the “rules of 
the game” and constraints the firm resources that can be unfold in the host country (Xu 
& Shenkar, 2002). In developed host countries and within the acquired companies, 
knowledge distance might raise fears of losing critical technologies and know-how to 
foreign competition, a sentiment that might be exacerbated when the acquirer comes 
from an underdeveloped economy (Meyer et al., 2014). Hence, AfMNEs’ ownership 
strategies may be primarily driven by considerations over cross-country distances 
regarding the administrative and knowledge dimensions. 
 
3.1 Administrative distance  
Specifically, administrative distance, as defined by Berry et al. (2010), 
encompasses cross-country differences in legal systems and language, while also 
accounting for the existence of colonial ties between them. The administrative 
dimension goes beyond the formal institutional arrangement provided by the legal 
framework to include the informal influence of normative and cognitive social 
structures when setting the rule of law of a given country (Berry et al., 2010).   
Because the administrative dimension, as measured by Berry et al. (2010), 
encompasses differences in the legal framework between home and host countries, it 
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can be an important source of uncertainty for the MNE. Legal system contingencies 
impact MNEs organizations capabilities and strategically positioning operations 
because managers’ perceptions of host country’s ex ante commercial law inadequacy 
and ex post judicial arbitrariness both impact MNEs’ political ties intensity in the 
foreign country (White III, Boddewyn & Galang, 2015). In other words, MNEs’ needs 
for non-market capabilities to effectively gather legitimacy in the host country through 
ties with the government, government officials or other local entities (such as trade 
associations, unions and local firms) depend upon managerial perceptions of the foreign 
legal system regarding  the adequacy of the laws and the quality of its enforcement. The 
relevance of this institutional dimension lies in its potential for increasing the 
uncertainty MNEs must cope with while conditioning how MNEs adapt to the 
international business environment. 
Africa presents an interesting institutional context when considering Berry et al. 
(2010) administrative dimension. Since the XV century and until the XX century, apart 
Liberia and Ethiopia, the whole African continent was colonized. This huge 
colonization was mainly dominated by France and Great Britain, but other countries, 
such as Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Italy also had their colonies in Africa. 
Administrative distance refers primarily to differences between countries’ legal systems, 
and comprehends common language and the existence of colonial ties as well (Berry et 
al., 2010). According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), 
generally, existing commercial laws are rooted in two main origins: the common law, 
which is British rooted, and the civil law, which is originated in Roman law and is 
actually close to the French and German civil traditions. Hence, due to the existence of 
multiple colonial ties and different legal framework influences, it is expectable that 
within the African continent each country administrative institutional measure often 
varies. Hence, cross-country administrative distance poses legitimacy hurdles which, in 
turn, might influence AfMNEs ownership strategies. 
Regarding the perceived administrative distance between home and host 
countries, AfMNEs strategic choice for full or partial ownership when performing a 
CBA seems to be dependent upon firms’ nonmarket capabilities and how these 
capabilities might be effective in the host country. Absence of historical ties in 
conjunction with differences in legal frameworks and language magnifies uncertainty, 
either by hindering understanding over the existing regulatory framework (Tykvová & 
Shertler, 2014) or through hampering perceptions over direction and frequency of 
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possible future institutional changes (Meyer, 2001). While the former might preclude 
the transfer of knowledge and routines between the parent firm and its subsidiary (Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002; Meyer, 2001; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), inhibiting MNEs efficacy 
abroad, the latter highlights the need to identify the most relevant legitimating actors in 
the host country in order to achieve and maintain legitimacy (De Villa et al., 2015), and 
safeguard against private and public expropriation hazards that may arise (Delios & 
Henisz, 2000), thus demanding non-market capabilities. 
The preference for a partial ownership in administrative distant countries seems to 
be adequate for achieving two purposes: the management of operational risk and the 
management of legitimacy in the host country. By sharing risks with a local partner 
AfMNEs might get access to local tacit knowledge with reduced transaction costs 
(Ando, 2012). Likewise, Dikova (2009, p. 46) states that “a joint operation with a local 
partner might be a “substitute” for own market experience”. Also, by partnering with a 
local firm MNEs also may shield themselves against foreign government threats such as 
shifts in industry and tax policies or “outright expropriation of private sector assets” 
(Delios & Henisz, 2000, p. 307), while undertaking effective political strategies (Li et 
al., 2013), managing environmental uncertainties and improving firm performance (Li, 
Chen, Liu & Peng, 2014). Furthermore, partnerships might be helpful to mitigate the 
institutional distance effects due to cross-country differences regarding issues such as 
environmental protection and social responsibility (Lu et al., 2008). In hypothesizing 
from the above mentioned I propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Greater administrative distance between the acquirer’s African 
home country and the target is negatively related to the ownership in CBAs, 
such that AfMNEs are more likely to seek a partial ownership as home-host 
administrative distance increases. 
 
3.2 Knowledge distance 
There are several reasons pointed out by the literature for MNEs from emerging 
economies to enter host countries in high developed institutional settings, each one 
posing specific obstacles for obtaining legitimacy. Some of those reasons are as follows: 
overcoming their home countries institutional limitations; gaining access to new 
technologies and know-how; accessing new markets; accessing new distribution 
channels; and seeking free rides in well-established brand images (Delios & Henisz, 
2000; Peng, 2012; Osabutey, Williams & Debrah, 2014; Hernández & Nieto, 2015; 
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Lebedev, Peng, Xie & Stevens, 2015). Most of these reasons encompass a strategic 
asset seeking motive aiming at the enhancement of the firm’s competitive advantage at 
home or within a third-country market (Meyer, 2015). Knowledge distance refers to the 
differences between talent, innovation, creativity and capacity to create knowledge 
(Berry et al., 2010). Specifically in what concerns to cross-country knowledge distance, 
due to the technological leakage threat that it can be associated with, these reasons 
might hinder AfMNEs’ achievement of legitimacy abroad (Meyer et al., 2014). 
Ownership strategies help MNEs deal with the legitimacy problems posed by 
knowledge distance issues. The literature suggests that networks are conducive to 
innovation (Chen et al., 2012) and that “tacit knowledge is regarded as more important 
for innovation” (Lu et al., 2008, p. 362). Knowledge transfer and innovation capabilities 
seem to require interaction and team work between foreign firms and local ones 
(Osabutey et al., 2014). Hence, managers perceived cross-country knowledge distance 
impacts AfMNEs decisions regarding the CBA equity composition because it may 
affect decisively either the access of the firm to technology and know-how or the firm’s 
ability to transfer its knowledge based products, processes and routines to, or from, its 
subsidiary. 
MNEs need to carefully assess the institutional environment in order to 
understand the potential impact of knowledge distances in their ability to manage 
legitimacy when engaging in a CBA. Knowledge-based resources are environmental 
dependent, being particularly useful for improving firm performance in changing and 
unpredictable environments (Miller & Shamsie, 1996). The environmental context 
conditions the value of a knowledge-based resource at least in two ways. First, 
knowledge-based resources involve a multiplicity of skills and talents from different 
sources – including technical, creative and collaborative skills – that once interrelated 
(Weigelt & Miller, 2013) will enable the firms to adapt their product to market needs 
and challenges (Miller & Shamsie, 1996). Second, knowledge can be “denied if it is 
perceived to be in contradiction with existing social norms or to raise a challenge to 
current institutional rules” (Lu et al., 2008, p. 366). This institutional constraint applies 
in several moments of knowledge manipulation such as its creation, transmission, 
imitation or relocation (Lu et al., 2008). Hence, cross-country knowledge distance can 
be troublesome either by posing perceptional issues regarding foreign market 
understanding or hindering firms’ ability to achieve legitimacy.  
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Moreover, the protection of technology transferred between home and host 
countries as well as the scope of patent protection and copyright vary across countries 
(Ang, Benischke & Doh, 2015) adding another source of uncertainty. Home and host 
governments may also enhance or inhibit MNEs perceived uncertainty regarding 
knowledge distance issues through tax incentives or other specific policies fostering 
technological development (Chen, Li & Shapiro, 2012), posing an additional challenge 
for the management of legitimacy in the foreign country. 
Africa is lagging world developed countries on technology and know-how issues, 
either on tacit or codified knowledge, suggesting that the preference for a partial 
ownership in knowledge distant countries seems to be adequate for achieving several 
purposes: as a facilitator for the transfer of innovation and know-how which is often 
tacit in nature; as a facilitator to adequate product, processes and routines to market 
needs; and as a facilitator for the management of legitimacy in the host country. Lu et 
al. (2008) state that relational arrangements between organizations, such as partnerships, 
strategic alliances, and networks, favor knowledge transfer and imitation. Further Kogut 
and Singh (1988, p. 412) argued that “joint ventures are not merely a matter of equity 
control, but represent a set of governance characteristics appropriate for certain 
strategic or transaction cost motivations or for the transfer of tacit organizational 
knowledge”, setting the ownership structure decision as a “vehicle by which to share 
complementary but distinct knowledge which could not otherwise be shared or to 
coordinate a limited set of activities to influence the competitive positioning of the 
firm”. Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Greater knowledge distance between the acquirer’s African home 
country and the target is negatively related to the ownership in CBAs, such that 
AfMNEs are more likely to seek a partial ownership as home-host country 
knowledge distance increases. 
 
3.3 Target institutional development 
The level of the host country institutional development influences MNEs 
establishment mode choices (Chen, Cui, Li & Rolfe, 2016; Dikova & Brothers, 2016). 
Leastwise, research suggests that there are two different strategic perspectives through 
which managers must look at the level of the host country institutional development 
because it has different effects on MNEs legitimacy  
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First, the level of the target country institutional development influences MNEs’ 
resource-based strategies for rent generation and legitimating strategies (Chan et al., 
2008; Miller & Shamsie, 1996). If the MNE is aiming at targets in institutionally higher 
developed host countries it is likely that firm specific market resources and capabilities 
become more relevant. In this case, the firm is facing a more stable, credible and market 
supporting institutional environment (Peng, 2002, 2003; Lin, Peng, Yang & Sun, 2009; 
Hoskisson et al., 2013; Hernández & Nieto, 2015) requiring less personal relationships 
for achieving legitimacy abroad. Institutional pressures for conformity are widely 
spread over the competing firms (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Dacin, 1997) thus MNEs cannot 
expect to have a large wiggle room for significantly improve their competitive 
advantage and legitimacy achievement through the use of nonmarket capabilities (Chan 
et al., 2008). In this instance, Miller and Shamsie (1996) show that property-based 
resources acquire more relevance for firms’ performance in more stable environments. 
Conversely, if a firm is entering institutionally less developed host countries then 
knowledge-based resources gain preponderance (Miller & Shamsie, 1996) and 
nonmarket capabilities loom as crucial to firms success as well (Peng et al., 2009; Li et 
al., 2014; Estrin et al, 2016). The level of the host country institutional development 
impacts the firm’s ability to generate returns from its investment and the appropriate 
strategies for gaining legitimacy abroad (Shenkar et al, 2008).  
Second, target institutional development decisively impacts the costs of doing 
business abroad (Chan et al., 2008; Meyer, 2001) influencing MNEs’ risk management 
strategies. Weak institutional environments are characterized by government 
arbitrariness (Aybar & Ficici, 2009), inadequacy of legal environment and tenuous law 
enforcement (White III et al., 2015), which lead to the rising role of normative and 
cognitive institutional pillars in regulating the interactions between economic agents 
(Peng, 2002, 2003; Peng et al., 2009). In these instances, transaction costs importance 
magnifies because the absence of market-supporting regulations inhibits the 
establishment of efficient negotiations, bureaucracies are often exacerbated, and the 
orientation of government policies often lacks both consistency and credibility (Murtha 
& Lenway, 1994). Thus, the amount of uncertainty present in this environment demands 
MNEs to develop nonmarket capabilities in order to manage legitimacy, while trying to 
keep as low as possible the operational costs of doing business. Also, in these 
environments, gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy require specific dynamics 
that are different from the ones needed to succeed in developed institutional settings 
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(Suchman, 1995). Consequently, the level of the host country institutional development 
strongly influences the MNEs ownership choices when pursuing a CBA. 
According to Xu and Shenkar (2002), when engaging in international business 
endeavors, small integration costs lead MNEs to opt for majority stakes. The literature 
confirms the above mentioned arguments favoring the existence of a positive 
relationship between the level of the host country institutional development and the 
preference for full ownership (Hernández & Nieto, 2015; De Beule et al., 2014; Chan et 
al., 2008; Ando, 2012; Harzing, 2002; Meyer, 2001; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000). Nonetheless, Elango and Pattnaik (2011, p. 465) point out two more 
potential factors favoring AfMNEs’ entrance into institutionally high developed host 
countries through a full ownership acquisition. First, acquirers coming from less 
developed economies “lack critical capabilities to operate locally” in developed host 
markets. Therefore, by acquiring a target firm in the developed host country the MNE 
overcomes entry barriers and get access to those capabilities the firm is aiming at. 
Second, since the MNE likely does not bring much to a partnership with a local firm in 
the institutionally developed host country it is doubtful that there are firms “willing to 
partner with emerging market firms to help them on their home turf” (Elango & 
Pattnaik, 2011, p. 467). Thus, I hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Greater host country institutional development is positively related 
to the ownership in CBAs, such that AfMNEs are more likely to seek full 
ownership in more institutionally developed target countries. 
 
I further propose that the analysis of the MNE institutional context needs to 
include both the institutional distance considerations and the analysis of the level of 
institutional development of the host country. Chan at al. (2008, p. 1180) defined the 
level of institutional development as “the extent to which the economic, political, and 
social institutions in a host country are developed and are favorable to foreign 
affiliates”. For instance, legitimacy has a role preventing hostility and conflict 
situations, while behaviors towards xenophobia, ethnicity or national sovereignty, often 
help defining a geopolitical context (Shenkar et al., 2008). Those may not easily be 
captured only through the analysis of institutional distance when one strives for sensing 
how to obtain legitimacy abroad. The institutional environment is important for 
international business strategy because it is a key determinant of firm structure and 
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behavior (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Therefore MNEs will likely enhance their capabilities 
to compete abroad by considering in tandem the institutional distance and the level of 
institutional development of the host country.  
The most subtle although important difference between the concepts of 
institutional distance and legitimacy lies in the direction of the analysis regarding the 
goal of overcoming uncertainty. Within the institutional distance concept, the main 
actor trying to overcome uncertainty is the firm. Managers’ capabilities for 
understanding host country market conditions determine how distant the foreign market 
is perceived (Brewer, 2007; Dikova, 2009; Sousa & Lages, 2011), thus conditioning the 
firm’s international business strategies. Consequently, under the institutional distance 
rationale, the efforts to overcome uncertainty are MNE centered. Within the legitimacy 
concept, the acceptance of MNEs operations as desirable, proper, and adequate depends 
on foreign constituencies (Kostova et al., 2008; Suchman, 1995), prompting that the 
efforts to overcome uncertainty are now centered in the host country main actors. In 
other words, while the institutional distance concept relates to the efforts of a MNE for 
overcoming the inherent risks of engaging in international business activities, the 
concept of legitimacy rests in host country’s legitimate constituencies evaluating the 
uncertainties and possible consequences carried out by the deployment of MNE’s 
activities in their territory. 
 While institutional distance buttresses its analysis tools from upstream to 
downstream, the achievement of host country legitimacy also requires an analysis from 
downstream to upstream. The former tries to answer the question “what do we know 
about the host country market conditions in order to do business successfully” while the 
latter seeks to know “what should we accomplish in order to be accepted in the host 
country”. To succeed, MNEs need to both adapt to the international business 
environment and overcome the lack of knowledge about market conditions abroad 
(Ferreira, Serra & Reis, 2011). Therefore, because of their implications over the scope 
of uncertainty the acquirer firm is faced with, integrating the two concepts enhances our 
understanding over the appropriate strategies to be delineated by MNEs when engaging 
in their international endeavors. 
Since strong or weak host country institutional environments do not have “the 
same limiting role when firms seek legitimacy” (Hernández & Nieto, 2015, p. 124), then 
the level of institutional development of the host country should act as a moderator of 
the cross-country distance effect over AfMNEs ownership stake choices in their CBAs. 
24 
 
Considering institutional effects, the literature provides two interesting studies that 
enhance our understanding over MNEs’ ownership strategic choices.  
First, Brouthers and Brouthers (2001, p. 178) explained that “an apparent 
paradox exists with respect to the relationship between cultural distance and entry 
mode choice”. Drawing over a similar perception of distance, the authors identify two 
separate theoretical guidelines for the chosen ownership: (1) one consisting of several 
studies where partial ownership choices were taken as appropriate for increasing firm 
flexibility dealing with the risks abroad, while simultaneously accessing local 
knowledge; and (2) another set of studies where full ownership choices were considered 
beneficial for providing reduction in integration costs, enhancing control over the 
venture and protecting the MNE against partner opportunistic behavior. In their study, 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) outline that host country risk is a moderator of the 
perceived distance effect. The authors measured country risk as the perceived stability 
of the social, economic and political environment; considered a sample of firms from 
developed economies entering emerging markets; and found that, when facing cultural 
distant and high investment risk countries, MNEs prefer higher ownership. In this 
instance, MNEs increase their ownership position to better manage the risks involved. 
The choice of ownership is thus, at least in part, driven by control considerations. 
Second, Chan et al. (2008), considering a sample of Japanese home firms and 
investigating the effect of the level of the host country institutional development in their 
subsidiaries performance conclude that the performance of the subsidiaries can be low 
in either settings, in institutionally developed or in underdeveloped host countries. 
However, these authors did find that the variation of the subsidiaries performance was 
quite higher in institutionally less developed host countries, increasing the prospects for 
profit potential at higher uncertainty. They have found out as well that advanced 
economies (such as United States, France, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy) fell 
into the low risk-low return category. To disentangle the combined institutional effects 
coming from cross-national distance and legitimacy issues MNEs need to consider their 
generating rent ability within the inherent risk framework. 
 According to the Uppsala model (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977) firms are naturally risk averse. The model presumes that MNEs will 
enter foreign markets with low commitment entry modes and gradually increase their 
commitment as long as their familiarity with host countries becomes higher. Therefore, 
in this model, higher ownership levels will be sought when the perceived investment 
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risk is lower. However, empirically, research did not always support the model, which 
leaded to the cultural distance paradox. Nonetheless, all else equal, the assumption that 
firms have a negative stance towards risk must be considered since firms would not be 
willing to accept more risk in their investment without a substantial increase in the 
potential profit. Thus, when AfMNEs are entering more institutionally developed 
countries through a CBA, they will probably be facing less uncertainty due to easiness 
in obtaining legitimacy while simultaneously increasing their prospects for future 
profits at home. Thus, in this case where the risks are lower and legitimacy easier to 
achieve, higher ownership stakes seem to be more adequate, allowing AfMNEs to fully 
capitalize the investment abroad.  
Conversely, when entering institutionally underdeveloped settings, AfMNEs will 
be facing environments were legitimacy is more difficult to achieve. Therefore, the 
increase in uncertainty due to legitimacy difficulties coupled with cross-country 
differences issues inhibits the AfMNE to take full advantage of the host market 
potential and, consequently, will likely lead the AfMNE to look for a partnership. The 
partnership is preferable if it provides a reduction in the uncertainty AfMNEs is going 
to face abroad concerning its legitimacy achievement in the host country, while 
simultaneously improving the firm’s ability to increase its investment profit potential by 
capturing opportunities (Li et al., 2014). 
Research confirms that institutionally higher developed countries will lead MNEs 
to prefer higher commitment entry modes (Hernández & Nieto, 2015; De Beule et al., 
2014; Meyer et al., 2009) and that less developed institutions increase the perception of 
the difficulties to properly manage regulative distance (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010). 
Therefore, regarding the expected moderating action of the level of the host country 
institutional development over the effect on ownership by administrative distance, I 
propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The level of institutional development of the host country 
moderates the relationship between administrative distance and the choice of 
ownership, such that the effects of administrative distance on the ownership are 
weaker when the institutional development of the host country is higher. 
 
The hypotheses presented above are represented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual model 
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4. Method 
 
4.1 Data and sample 
This study uses a sample of CBAs made by AfMNEs from 1985 to 2015. The data 
on CBAs were obtained from the Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions database (SDC 
Platinum) prepared by Thomson Financial Securities. This database has been widely 
used for international business research (e.g., Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Elango et al., 
2013).  
In selecting the sample I have followed a number of procedures. First, I have 
considered only those CBAs that were “completed”, thus excluding those that were not 
yet completed until the final day of the dataset, and those that were classified as rumors. 
Second, only initial operations were considered to avoid biases due to the existence of 
previous knowledge and experience related to the specifics of the transaction. Third, 
following prior research, I only included CBAs for which the acquirer firm was 
acquiring an ownership stake equal or greater than 10% of the target’s equity (Dikova, 
2009). Albeit the literature is not consensual in establishing a cut-off point, the rationale 
is that a too small ownership stake – such as 5%, for instance – may be revealing a 
portfolio investment, aimed at speculative investments. Fourth, I only considered CBAs 
in which the acquirer firm was based in an African country. Fifth, I excluded cases 
where the CBA involved an acquisition in an offshore and also those instances 
involving firms from the islands of Reunion (as home country) and Isle of Man (as host 
country). Both islands are dependencies of other sovereign countries, namely, France 
and United Kingdom. These procedures resulted in a total of 942 CBAs made by 
AfMNEs during the thirty year period, from 1985 to 2015. 
Specifically, I have chosen to test the hypotheses by analyzing the last seven years 
of the database, from 2009 to 2015, which allows for obtaining experience measures 
from previous years, between 1985 and 2008. Table 1 describes the final database 
which consists of 314 CBA’s made by AfMNEs, from 24 home countries in 71 host 
countries. Following, Table 2 describes the sample by percentage of ownership 
acquired. 
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Table 1. Number of acquisitions by country: 2009 to 2015 
 
World 
Total 
In       
Africa 
Out of 
Africa 
Europe NAFTA 
Central 
and 
South 
America 
Asia, 
Middle 
East 
and 
Oceania 
Home countries 314 130 184 97 26 8 53 
Algeria 5 0 5 5 0 0 0 
Angola 4 0 4 1 0 2 1 
Botswana 6 5 1 0 1 0 0 
Cameroon 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Dem Rep Congo 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Egypt 29 5 24 10 5 0 9 
Ethiopia 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Ghana 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Ivory Coast 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 14 12 2 0 1 0 1 
Libya 3 1 2 1 1 0 0 
Mali 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Morocco 19 13 6 3 0 1 2 
Namibia 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 
Nigeria 20 11 9 6 2 0 1 
Rep of Congo 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Rwanda 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
South Africa 184 65 119 63 13 5 38 
Sudan 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Tanzania 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Togo 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 8 4 4 4 0 0 0 
Zambia 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Zimbabwe 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
        Host countries   Host countries   Host countries   
Angola 2 Italy   2 Rwanda   4 
Australia 18 Ivory Coast 7 Sao Tome 1 
Benin 1 Jordan   1 Saudi Arabia 1 
Bosnia 1 Kenya   10 Senegal   2 
Botswana 7 Lebanon   2 Singapore 2 
Brazil 6 Lithuania   1 Somalia   1 
Burkina Faso 1 Luxembourg 1 South Africa 5 
Cameroon 1 Malawi   4 South Korea 3 
Canada 8 Malaysia   3 Spain   4 
Chile 2 Mali   1 Sudan   1 
China 5 Mexico   2 Sweden   1 
Cyprus 2 Morocco   2 Switzerland 1 
Czech Republic 3 Mozambique 6 Syria   2 
Dem Rep Congo 3 Namibia   4 Tanzania   6 
Egypt 2 Netherlands 4 Togo   2 
Ethiopia 4 New Zealand 2 Tunisia   1 
France 16 Niger   1 Turkey   1 
Gabon 1 Nigeria   18 Uganda   3 
Gambia 1 Papua N Guinea 1 United Kingdom 43 
Germany 6 Poland   3 United States 16 
Ghana 8 Portugal   3 United Arab Emi 5 
India 4 Qatar   1 Zambia   10 
Indonesia 2 Rep of Congo 2 Zimbabwe 8 
Ireland Rep 3 Russian Fed 3       
Source:  With data collected from SDC Platinum       
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Table 2. Number of cases by percentage of ownership acquired 
   
Acquisitions In Africa 
 
Acquisitions Out of Africa 
 
Total acquisitions 
      Target is high-tech 
Target is not high-
tech 
 
Target is high-tech 
Target is not high-
tech 
 
Target is high-tech 
Target is not high-
tech 
Minority ownership  
 
5 28 
 
5 29 
 
10 57 
Equal ownership 
 
0 2 
 
0 5 
 
0 7 
Majority ownership 
 
4 38 
 
6 19 
 
10 57 
Full ownership 
 
11 42 
 
28 92 
 
39 134 
  Total   20 110   39 145   59 255 
                      
      Same industry * Not same industry   Same industry * Not same industry 
 
Same industry * Not same industry 
Minority ownership  
 
16 17 
 
16 18 
 
32 35 
Equal ownership 
 
2 0 
 
2 3 
 
4 3 
Majority ownership 
 
30 12 
 
9 16 
 
39 28 
Full ownership 
 
41 12 
 
67 53 
 
108 65 
  Total   89 41   94 90   183 131 
           
      
Host more 
developed Host less developed 
 
Host more 
developed Host less developed 
 
Host more 
developed Host less developed 
Minority ownership  
 
4 29 
 
32 2 
 
36 30 
Equal ownership 
 
0 2 
 
4 1 
 
4 3 
Majority ownership 
 
8 34 
 
24 1 
 
32 35 
Full ownership 
 
12 41 
 
118 2 
 
130 43 
  Total   24 106   178 6   202 112 
* It is considered acquisition within the same industry if there is one case of similarity between acquirer and target firms at the 3 digit sic code level. 
 Source: Author’s computations with data collected from SDC Platinum.
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4.2 Variables 
The dependent variable is ownership. This study focuses on the relationship 
between AfMNEs faced institutional context and their ownership strategic choices when 
engaging in a CBA. It is important to mention that previous studies outline the high 
incidence of complete ownership as the MNEs’ favorite choice (Chari & Chang, 2009; 
De Beule et al., 2014). Full ownership seems to be meaningful because the level of 
control the acquirer firm is able to secure is quite different in a complete ownership 
scenario when compared to a partial ownership stake choice (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; 
Chari & Chang, 2009; Kedia & Bilgili, 2015). Following extant research, I used a 
threshold of 95% of the target equity to qualify the operation as a full acquisition (e.g., 
Dikova, 2009; Elango et al., 2013). Consequently, the dependent variable, ownership, 
was measured as a dichotomous variable, using the data collected from SDC. Full 
acquisitions were coded “1” and partial acquisitions were coded “0”.  
 
Independent Variables 
The independent variable administrative distance captures the regulative 
differences between home and host countries, and encompasses country differences in 
legal systems, language, religion, and bureaucratic patterns due to colonial ties (Berry et 
al., 2010). Although the literature presents different measures, calculation methods and 
databases for calculating institutional distances between countries, I have used Berry et 
al. (2010) measure of administrative distance. This data is made publicly available on-
line at http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/ciber/faculty_research .asp. I have used the 
Mahalanobis method for the calculation of administrative distance.  
Using Mahalanobis as the method, instead of the perhaps more common 
Euclidean distances, is better suited for measuring country differences because of its 
procedural properties and the manner in which it handles the characterization of the 
variables used to measure those dissimilarities. For instance, “the variables that 
characterize countries tend to be very highly correlated with one another” and the 
Mahalanobis method is better than the Eucledian method to statistically deal with such 
specificity while meeting the five desirable properties that distance measures ought to 
exhibit: symmetry, non-negativity, identification, definiteness, and triangle inequality 
(Berry et al., 2010, p. 1469). 
I have followed identical reasoning for knowledge distance. This variable captures 
country differences related to their capacity to create knowledge and innovate, and it 
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might decisively impact the post-acquisition integration process (Risberg, 2003; 
Rugman et al., 2011) and the achievement of legitimacy abroad as well (Meyer et al., 
2014). Data for this variable was also collected from Berry et al. (2010).  
The independent variable target institutional development assessed the level of 
institutional development of the host country. This variable was computed with data 
from the Human Development Index as disclosed by the United Nations. Chan et al. 
(2008), for their study about the effect of the level of institutional development of the 
host country in foreign affiliate performance, built the Institutional Development Index 
(IDI). This index is a measure that aggregates 12 institutional variables in three 
institutional sectors as follows: (1) economic institutions – GDP per capita, economic 
conditions, distribution infrastructure, and financial resources; (2) political institutions – 
intellectual property rights, political system, law and order, and bureaucracy quality; 
and (3) social institutions – justice, harassment and violence, corruption in government, 
and civil freedom. These authors found that their IDI was highly correlated with other 
institutional measures used worldwide. For instance, that the Human Development 
Index (HDI) had correlation coefficients with the IDI of about 0.8 between 1996 and 
2001. Moreover, data on the HDI is available for every year of this study, thus allowing 
capturing possible improvements on the extent of institutional development of the 
countries. The HDI encompasses a life expectancy index, an education index, and a 
GDP index as well. 
 
Control variables 
I further included a number of control variables at the transaction, firm, industry 
and country level, as follows.  
At the deal level I have controlled for the transaction value since deals involving 
greater financial disbursements could lead the acquirer to assume only a partial 
acquisition, or a lower ownership stake in the target. This variable thus controls for the 
potential effect of the value of the transaction in the AfMNEs’ ownership stake choice. 
Data for this variable was collected directly from SDC and reported in millions of US 
dollars.  
I controlled for the degree of diversification because research has shown that 
acquirer diversification levels may impact entry mode choices (Delios & Henisz, 2000; 
Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Aybar & Ficici, 2009; White III et al., 2015). The variable degree 
of diversification assesses whether the acquisition involved entering a business that was 
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not already in the acquirer’s portfolio, assessed at the four-digits SIC codes. The 
variable was measured as a dichotomous variable using the data collected from SDC, 
where acquisitions outside acquirer previous range of four-digit SIC codes were coded 
“1” and acquisitions of target with at least one equal SIC code of the acquirer firm were 
coded “0”. 
The variable experience in CBAs captures acquirer firms’ capability of conducting 
CBAs. The literature emphasizes the importance of international experience for the 
multinationals entry mode choice decision-making process (Johanson & Valhne, 1977; 
Gaur & Lu, 2007; Dow & Larimo, 2009, 2011; Arslan & Larimo, 2011; Elango et al., 
2013; Lebedev et al., 2015). The variable was computed as the sum of the number of 
cross-border acquisitions by the acquirer between 1985 (the first year SDC started 
reporting non-US transactions) and the focal deal. Data was collected from SDC and 
measured as the number of prior cross-border acquisitions completed by the acquirer 
firms. 
Experience in host region identifies whether the acquirer firm already possessed 
previous acquisition experience in the host country region. Dow and Larimo (2011) 
outlined that prior location experience thus matter for firms in selecting the entry mode 
since prior experience reduce the risks and uncertainties for firms. Data was obtained 
from SDC Platinum and computed as a dichotomous variable taking the value of “1” 
when the acquirer firm had prior experience in the host region, and “0” otherwise. 
Experience in host country, following Dow and Larimo (2011), captures the 
influence of cluster-specific experiences in the MNE strategic decision-making process. 
In essence, this variable identifies whether the acquirer firms had prior acquisition 
experience specifically in the host country.  Computations were based on data collected 
from the SDC Platinum, and the variable was coded dichotomously with “1” when the 
acquirer firm had previous experience in the host country, and “0” otherwise. 
The variable industry relatedness identifies whether the acquisition is made by the 
acquirer in an industry that was not already in the acquirer’s SIC codes list at the three 
digit classification. This variable allows controlling for information asymmetries 
between the acquirer and the target firm (Chari & Chang, 2009).  Data on the SIC codes 
of acquirer and target firms was collected from SDC and the variable was 
operationalized as a dummy variable that took the value of “1” if the acquired firm was 
in the same industry as the acquirer at the three-digit SIC code classification, and “0” 
otherwise. 
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The variable target is high-tech identifies whether the target firm operates in a 
high-tech industry. This variable was chosen because previous research suggests that, 
when institutional uncertainty increases, firms should pursue a full acquisition because 
it “could potentially allow the firms to better protect their newly acquired technology in 
an unfamiliar institutional setting” (Elango et al., 2013, p. 12). Data for this variable is 
explicitly reported in the SDC Platinum database. The industries considered for 
qualifying the target firm as belonging to a high-tech industry are the following: 
communications; computer equipment; biotechnology; and electronics. The variable 
was coded dichotomously with “1” when the acquired firm belongs to the high-tech 
industry group and coded “0” otherwise. 
At the country level, I have included four variables. I have controlled for the host 
country inflation that is a commonly used indicator of macroeconomic stability. This 
variable is used as the inflation rate in host country in the year prior to the acquisition. 
The Euromoney’s Special Report 2015 outlines the effects of the host country inflation 
over both interest rates and currency exchange rates, thus crucial for multinationals to 
be able to trade across borders under more stable conditions. Data was collected from 
World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015. 
The variable acquirer nation GDPpc accounts for the home country gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, since the country’s wealth is likely to influence the 
choice of entry mode and ownership (Meyer et al., 2009; Dikova & Brouthers, 2016). 
Data for the GDP was collected from the World Bank, and specifically the World 
Development Indicators made available in 2015. Following previous studies, I have 
used the logarithm of US dollar GDP per capita (Hernández & Nieto, 2015; Elango et 
al., 2013).  
The variable cultural distance accounts for the cultural differences between home 
and host countries. The international business literature has been burgeoning in 
highlighting the influence of cultural differences in managerial decisions, performance 
and entry modes (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Hofstede, 1984, 1993; Aybar & Ficici, 2009; 
Elango et al., 2013). Data for cultural distance were obtained from Berry et al.’s (2010) 
database and is based on the Euclidian distance using Hosfetede’s (1980) values and 
Kogut and Singh (1988) formula. 
The variable geographic distance represents the distance between home and host 
countries. The cost of doing business abroad is likely to increase with physical distance, 
since farther away operations are more difficult to monitor and manage, and this 
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variables has been extensively used in prior research (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000, 
2001; Hernández & Nieto, 2015; Ang et al., 2015). Data were obtained from Berry et 
al.’s (2010) database, based on the distance between the countries’ capital cities. 
The year when the transaction took place was also controlled for to account for 
the possibility of variations in the ownership stake choices across time. I have included 
a dummy variable for each year of the sample (Dow & Larimo, 2011), 2009 to 2015. 
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Table 3. Description of the variables 
Variable Description Source 
Ownership A threshold of 95% of the target equity to qualify 
the operation as a full acquisition (Dikova, 2009; 
Elango et al., 2013) was coded "1", otherwise it 
was coded "0". 
SDC Platinum 
administrative 
distance 
Differences in colonial ties, language, religion, 
and legal systems between home and host 
countries. 
 
Berry et al. (2010) 
knowledge distance 
 
Differences in patents and scientific production 
between home and host countries. 
 
Berry et al. (2010) 
target institutional 
development 
 
Proxy for the level of host country institutional 
development using United Nations Human 
Development Index calculated for each country 
yearly. 
United Nations, 
Human Development 
Reports 
transaction value 
 
Acquisition transaction value (millions US 
dollars). 
 
SDC Platinum 
degree of 
diversification 
 
The acquisitions made by the acquirer in a 
business that was not already in the acquirer’s 
SIC codes list at the four digit classification, are 
coded "1". Otherwise, acquisitions are coded "0". 
SDC Platinum 
experience in CBAs 
 
Sum of the number of international acquisitions 
made by the acquirer in previous years. 
 
SDC Platinum 
experience in host 
region 
 
Dummy variable coded “1” if the acquirer had 
experience in acquisitions from previous years in 
the host region. 
SDC Platinum 
experience in host 
country 
 
Dummy variable coded “1” if the acquirer had 
experience in acquisitions from previous years in 
the host country. 
SDC Platinum 
industry relatedness 
 
Dummy variable which is coded “1” if the 
acquired firm is in the same industry as the 
acquirer at the three-digit SIC code 
classification, and coded “0” otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
target is high-tech 
 
Dummy variable coded “1” if the variable is 
considered operating in an high tech industry 
group according with SDC Platinum database, 
and coded “0” if not. 
SDC Platinum 
host country inflation 
 
Inflation rate in the host country in the year 
previous to the acquisition deal. 
 
World Bank, 
World Development 
Indicators 2015 
acquirer nation log 
GDPpc 
 
Log value of the home country GDP per capita. 
 
 
World Bank, 
World Development 
Indicators 2015 
cultural distance 
 
Differences in attitudes towards authority, trust, 
individuality, and importance of work and 
family, between home and host countries. 
Berry et al. (2010) 
geographic distance 
 
Great circle distance between geographic center 
of home and host countries. 
 
Berry et al. (2010) 
 
 
36 
 
4.3 Procedures of analyses 
To test the hypotheses I used binary logistic regression (BLR) since the dependent 
variable is the ownership coded dichotomously. The use of this method follows 
previous research (Dow & Larimo, 2011; Elango et al., 2013) and is appropriate 
because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. A positive and significant 
coefficient indicates that a variable is associated to a higher likelihood that a full 
acquisition is performed. Following prior research, I have used one year lagged values 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables ensuring the direction of 
causality (e.g., Chen et al., 2012). The regression model used to test the hypotheses had 
the following specification: 
Ownership = b0 +b1 administrative distance +b2 knowledge distance +b3 target 
institutional development +b4 target institutional development x administrative 
distance +b5-n (Controls) + . 
 
Moreover, aiming at outlining disparities related to regional idiosyncrasies, the 
hypotheses were initially analyzed considering the entire sample, and then repeated for 
two subsamples: one regarding only CBAs made in Africa; and another subsample 
considering cross-border acquisitions completed outside Africa. Finally, because more 
than 50% of total sample relate to South African firms, I further conducted the analysis 
with additional tests. I thus created two other subsamples of acquirer AfMNEs: one 
regards South African firms; and another considers non-South African companies.  
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5. Results 
 
Considering the full sample, Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics and Table 5 
displays the correlations between the variables. All the correlations are below 0.70 and 
the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are lower than 10. Correlations and VIF values 
were also considered in the subsamples in order to ensure this study is free of 
multicollinearity and autocorrelation issues. Moreover, Durbin-Watson tests were 
performed to ensure independency between the errors and reported values close to 2.0, 
and inside the range 1.5 – 2.5.  
This study analyses the moderator effect between the level of host country 
institutional development, target institutional development, and the predictor 
administrative distance. Following Fairchild and Mackinnon (2009) both variables were 
centered prior to model estimation to improve interpretation of regression coefficients 
when testing a moderation model. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
 
Full Sample CBAs in Africa CBAs Out of Africa South African CBAs 
non-South African 
CBAs 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
           
ownership 0.550 0.498 0.410 0.493 0.650 0.479 0.550 0.498 0.550 0.500 
administrative distance 6.880 7.225 5.405 6.154 7.725 7.394 6.307 7.949 7.692 5.992 
knowledge distance 3.928 5.094 1.043 2.505 5.871 5.412 4.547 5.266 3.059 4.723 
target institutional development 0.720 0.190 0.519 0.093 0.858 0.092 0.750 0.182 0.678 0.194 
transaction value 83.328 94.501 75.341 75.139 89.170 105.861 80.165 96.722 87.096 91.896 
degree of diversification 0.510 0.501 0.390 0.490 0.580 0.495 0.570 0.497 0.420 0.496 
experience in CBAs 5.170 9.694 2.290 4.542 7.180 11.674 7.830 11.690 1.400 3.119 
experience in host region 0.340 0.474 0.320 0.469 0.360 0.481 0.410 0.493 0.240 0.428 
experience in host country 0.130 0.337 0.030 0.173 0.200 0.402 0.170 0.375 0.080 0.268 
industry relatedness 0.540 0.499 0.630 0.484 0.480 0.501 0.490 0.501 0.620 0.488 
target is high-tech 0.190 0.391 0.150 0.362 0.210 0.410 0.230 0.424 0.120 0.330 
host country inflation 5.678 10.262 9.663 14.530 2.946 3.703 5.163 7.286 6.407 13.391 
acquirer nation log GDP pc 5,628.087 2,574.579 5,147.353 2,807.288 5,932.181 2,369.907 7,511.288 118.494 2,962.632 1,960.833 
cultural distance 19.852 6.444 19.445 6.517 20.092 6.381 20.859 6.036 19.414 6.944 
geographic distance 6,092,588 4,071.340 2,734.070 1,644.898 8,389.736 3,609.058 7,663.067 3,868.054 3,869.757 3,239.851 
                      
Notes: Descriptive statistics are reported before any transformations (i.e. before the logarithmic transformation of home country GDPpc - variable 13; and before the variables 
2 and 4 were mean centered). 
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Table 5. Correlations matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
                
1 Ownership  1.000 
             
2 administrative distance  0.042  1.000 
            
3 knowledge distance  0.172***  0.024  1.000 
           
4 target inst. development  0.308***  0.052  0.571***  1.000 
          
5 transaction value  0.089  0.015  0.023  0.051  1.000 
         
6 degree of diversification -0.085  0.036  0.117**  0.199*** -0.048  1.000 
        
7 experience in CBAs  0.116** -0.070  0.072  0.221***  0.077  0.159***  1.000 
       
8 experience in host region -0.019 -0.080 -0.018 -0,011  0.185***  0.085  0.557***  1.000 
      
9 experience in host country  0.084 -0.106  0.065  0,230***  0.083  0.118**  0.483***  0.543***  1.000 
     
10 industry relatedness  0.094 -0.017 -0.115** -0.168***  0.033 -0.909*** -0.105 -0.086 -0.080  1.000 
    
11 target is high-tech  0.106 -0.026  0.096  0.102  0.143** -0.145**  0.260***  0.105  0.104  0.214***  1.000 
   
12 host country inflation -0.076 -0.010 -0.229*** -0.343***  0.050 -0.090 -0.087 -0.001 -0.084  0.079 -0.064  1.000 
  
13 acquirer nation log GDP pc -0.016 -0.160**  0.120**  0.287***  0.025  0.193***  0.226***  0.141**  0.131** -0.170***  0.107 -0.227***  1.000 
 
14 cultural distance -0.020  0.004  0.040  0.078  0.053  0.125**  0.011 -0.004  0.065 -0.128** -0.021 -0.151***  0.134** 1.000 
15 geographic distance  0.215***  0.097  0.469***  0.665***  0.056  0.170***  0.340***  0.080  0.239*** -0.146*** 0.170*** -0.266***  0.254*** 
 
0.104 
                                
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6 presents the statistical results of the tests of the hypothesis. Model 0 
includes only the control variables. Models 1 to 4 test the hypotheses. Model 5 is the 
complete model. The explanatory power of all models are ensured as their Chi-square 
values are significant at the p<0.05 level. 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that greater administrative distance will induce AfMNEs 
to seek partial ownership stakes. The coefficient for administrative distance in Model 1 
is positive and does not have statistical significance. Thus, Hypothesis 1 cannot be 
confirmed. The positive sign of the coefficient could be related to AfMNEs need to 
better protect themselves in environments that provide scarce legal protection rights for 
foreign investors. 
Hypothesis 2 suggested that greater knowledge distance between home and host 
countries will induce AfMNEs to seek partial ownership stakes. The coefficient in 
Model 2 is positive, which is in opposite direction with our expectation, and does not 
have statistical significance. Thus, I fail to confirm Hypothesis 2. One possible 
explanation for the positive sign of this coefficient can be related with the fact that the 
main sample is biased towards CBAs made out of Africa (184 out of 314) and countries 
outside the African continent are generally more institutionally developed than 
AfMNEs home countries. Therefore, AfMNEs might be facing fewer legitimacy 
problems because of being entering market friendly environments abroad, which induce 
managers to opt for higher ownership stake choices. 
Hypothesis 3 proposed that greater institutional development of the host country 
will induce AfMNEs to seek full ownership stakes. The coefficient in Model 3 
evidences a strongly significant positive effect (=3.872, p<0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 3 
was supported. This result supports the theoretical arguments arguing that advanced 
institutional settings, with fewer institutional voids, ease the costs of doing business 
abroad (Chan et al., 2008; Meyer, 2001), pose less legitimacy challenges and induce 
managers to opt for higher ownership stakes when engaging in a CBA. 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that greater institutional development of the host country 
moderates the relationship between administrative distance and the choice of ownership 
stake such that the effects of administrative distance on the choice of ownership stake 
are weaker when the level of the host country institutional development is higher. 
Model 4 shows a negative coefficient, and hence in the hypothesized direction, but not 
significant. Hence, I fail to confirm Hypothesis 4. Cross-country administrative distance 
poses obstacles for managers to realize host country’s commercial law adequacy and the 
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quality of its enforcement (White III et al., 2015). The absence of statistical significance 
for the moderation effect of the target institutional development over the effect of 
administrative distance on AfMNEs’ ownership stake choices might be related with a 
possible separation made by AfMNEs managers when analyzing the challenges 
presented by cross-country distances and those posed by the existence of institutional 
voids abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Table 6. Logistic regression results (African CBAs) 
 
Model 0 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 administrative distance 
  
 0.001 
     
 0.001 
 
 0.001 
 knowledge distance 
    
 0.046 
     
-0.002 
 target institutional development 
      
 3.872 ***  3.945 ***  3.955 *** 
target inst. development x adm. distance 
        
-0.143 
 
-0.143 
   
            transaction value  0.002 
 
 0.002 
 
 0.002 
 
 0.002 
 
 0.002 
 
 0.002 
 degree of diversification -0.409 
 
-0.412 
 
-0.374 
 
-0.543 
 
-0.476 
 
-0.478 
 experience in CBAs  0.028 
 
 0.028 
 
 0.030 *  0.029 
 
 0.029 
 
 0.029 
 experience in host region -0.656 * -0.656 * -0.648 * -0.396 
 
-0.416 
 
-0.415 
 experience in host country  0.433 
 
 0.437 
 
 0.454 
 
 0.119 
 
 0.073 
 
 0.070 
 industry relatedness  0.089 
 
 0.087 
 
 0.167 
 
 0.109 
 
 0.112 
 
 0.110 
 target is high-tech  0.209 
 
 0.210 
 
 0.165 
 
 0.222 
 
 0.272 
 
 0.274 
 host country inflation -0.009 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.007 
 
 0.002 
 
 0.001 
 
 0.001 
 acquirer nation log GDP pc -0.570 
 
-0.562 
 
-0.539 
 
-0.934 * -0.852 
 
-0.854 
 cultural distance -0.005 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.004 
 geographic distance  0.000 ***  0.000 ***  0.000 **  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Nagelkerke R Square 0.139 
 
0.139 
 
0.149 
 
0.203 
 
0.210 
 
0.210 
 Chi-square 34.446 *** 34.452 ** 37.007 *** 51.764 *** 53.707 *** 53.710 *** 
-2 log likelihood 397.584 
 
397.577 
 
395.022 
 
380.266 
 
378.322 
 
378.320 
 N 314 
 
314 
 
314 
 
314 
 
314 
 
314 
 
            
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.                       
 Dependent variable: Full ownership = 1 vs Partial ownership = 0. 
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Further analyses were done in order to ensure the validity of previous results and 
provide further insights by testing the hypotheses in different institutional contexts. 
 
5.1 Robustness checks 
Robustness tests were conducted to verify whether the results still hold when 
considering the percentage of ownership acquired as the predicted variable. Therefore, 
hypotheses 1 to 4 were tested using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). OLS regression was 
chosen given the continuous nature of the predicted variable. Thus, the analysis was 
performed with the percentage of ownership acquired as the dependent variable, instead 
of using a dichotomous coding.  
Results are shown in Table 7 and are consistent with the results obtained using 
Binary Logistic Regression analysis, suggesting that AfMNEs motives for pursuing 
higher levels of equity in a CBA are similar to those when the firms opt for a full 
acquisition. Hence, the institutional contexts that lead AfMNEs to pursue a full 
acquisition (acquisition of a share equal or greater than 95% of total target’s capital) 
may be quite the same to those that induce the firms to acquire the majority of the 
control of the target company as well. The level of institutional development of the host 
country evidences a positive relationship with AfMNEs’ search for higher levels of 
control. The analysis of distance, regarding administrative and knowledge cross-country 
differences, could not achieve statistical significance which might be related to both the 
heterogeneity of firms under analysis regarding resource differences (Oliver, 1997) and 
the dependence on individual managers’ perceptions for choosing the appropriate 
ownership strategy. 
However, OLS results regarding the control variables deserve a careful analysis 
since they generally confirm prior management theories. 
The transaction value coefficient across models in Table 7 is statistical significant 
and evidences a positive relationship between the likelihood of being targeted higher 
ownership stakes when the value involved in the transaction increases. This result is in 
line with the view that higher control modes are appropriated for the management of 
increasing risks (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Chari & Chang, 2009; Kedia & Bilgili, 2015).  
By the same token, although not statistically significant, the variable target is 
high-tech consistently reports a positive relationship with the dependent variable. This 
result is in line with previous research which stands that increasing asset specificity will 
likely lead to higher ownership stake choices (Ando, 2012).  
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The variable degree of diversification evidences a negative relationship with the 
full acquisition ownership choice. Although the coefficient never achieved statistical 
significance in any model, this negative relationship between ownership and the 
predictor degree of diversification is expectable because entering an unfamiliar business 
involves higher levels of uncertainty (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Xu & Shenkar, 2002; 
Aybar & Ficici, 2009; White III et al., 2015). 
Also, it is important to outline the consistent and opposite relationship reported by 
the coefficients for the control variables experience in host region and experience in 
CBAs. This study finds that there is a decreasing probability of an AfMNE pursuing 
higher ownership stakes in the acquisition when the firm’s experience in the host region 
increases, while the likelihood of pursuing a higher control mode acquisition increases 
when the firm’s general experience with acquisitions increases. Dow and Larimo (2011, 
p. 321) explain that cluster-specific experiential knowledge (such as experience in host 
region) and general internationalization knowledge (such as the knowledge acquired by 
AfMNEs through prior acquisitions) are “both significantly related to establishment 
mode choices, but in opposite directions”.  
The authors further explain that the first form of knowledge is often of a tacit 
nature, which likely impacts MNEs perceptions of distance towards the foreign country, 
while the second form of knowledge is more related with the firm internal management 
processes and ability to manage integration costs. Herein, the negative coefficient found 
for the relationship between percentage of ownership acquired and experience in host 
region seems to unveil that AfMNEs’ managers increasing knowledge about the host 
region consolidates their perceptions concerning the hampering effects of perceived 
distance, and increases their ability to promote local partnerships to better overcome 
those difficulties. Conversely, the positive coefficient found for the relationship 
between percentage of ownership acquired and the increasing cross-border acquisition 
experience suggests that the likelihood of an AfMNE pursuing a full ownership 
acquisition increases with the firm’s improvement in its internal management 
capabilities regarding the post-acquisition integration process.  
 
 
 
45 
 
Table 7. OLS regression results (African CBAs) 
 
Model 0 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 administrative distance 
  
 0.051 
     
 0.050 
 
 0.053 
 knowledge distance 
    
 0.582 
     
 0.108 
 target institutional development 
      
 40.043 ***  40.437 ***  39.111 *** 
target inst. development x adm. distance 
       
-1.848 
 
-1.819 
   
            transaction value  0.036 **  0.036 **  0.036 **  0.033 *  0.034 **  0.034 ** 
degree of diversification -12.480 
 
-12.591 
 
-12.153 
 
-13.404 * -12.585 * -12.516 * 
experience in CBAs  0.474 **  0.476 **  0.508 **  0.478 **  0.479 **  0.486 ** 
experience in host region -10.361 ** -10.378 ** -10.198 ** -7.412 * -7.839 * -7.900 * 
experience in host country  3.598 
 
 3.739 
 
 3.681 
 
 0.165 
 
-0.290 
 
-0.143 
 industry relatedness -6.007 
 
-6.076 
 
-5.169 
 
-5.688 
 
-5.788 
 
-5.647 
 target is high-tech  2.975 
 
 2.980 
 
 2.363 
 
 3.010 
 
 3.672 
 
 3.548 
 host country inflation -0.147 
 
-0.145 
 
-0.114 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.029 
 acquirer nation log GDP pc -13.001 * -12.701 * -12.751 * -16.379 ** -15.472 ** -15.304 ** 
cultural distance  0.003 
 
 0.001 
 
-0.008 
 
 0.033 
 
 0.007 
 
 0.004 
 geographic distance  0.001 **  0.001 *  0.001 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
             Adjusted R Square 0.066 
 
0.063 
 
0.070 
 
0.097 
 
0.098 
 
0.095 
 F 2.291 *** 2.160 *** 2.315 *** 2.877 *** 2.696 *** 2.563 *** 
N 314 
 
314 
 
314 
 
314 
 
314 
 
314 
 
            
 Dependent variable: Percentage of ownership acquired. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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5.2 Post-hoc analyses 
Post-hoc analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses using subsamples of the 
dataset for better identifying AfMNEs ownership strategic choices according to the 
disparate institutional contexts faced by the acquiring firms. In general, as shown by the 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 4, it is expectable that when AfMNEs engage in 
CBAs in Africa will face more familiar and underdeveloped institutional settings, and 
that CBAs made out of Africa will occur in more unfamiliar environments with higher 
levels of institutional development. Both instances may lead to specific ownership 
choices. I expect that the analysis of each subsample’s results may enhance our 
understanding over how cross-country differences and institutional voids effects 
combine to influence AfMNES’ ownership stake choices, and how those effects change 
according to the institutional context at hand. 
Table 8 displays the coefficients of the logistic regression analysis for the 
subsample composed by the acquisitions exclusively performed in Africa. This more 
specific institutional context presents a general situation where the institutional setting 
faced by the AfMNE is likely to be both familiar and underdeveloped. In this case, I 
expect AfMNEs to mostly face legitimacy challenges related to hurdles posed by the 
existence of institutional voids abroad.  
Model 1, which tests Hypothesis 1 for this subsample, shows a positive coefficient 
for the relationship between administrative distance and ownership. Albeit the signal of 
the coefficient is in opposite direction of what has been theoretically hypothesized, it 
confirms the result obtained in Table 6 for the full sample. Nonetheless, this result is in 
line with La Porta et al. (1998) findings. Spite these authors state that concentration of 
ownership is negatively related to investor protections, they also outline that the absence 
of good quality of law enforcement along with insufficient accounting standards induce 
investors to a response of ownership concentration. In these instances, higher ownership 
stakes become a surrogate for legal protection, either because of law inadequacy or 
because of inefficient law enforcement mechanisms. This result might be a consequence 
of AfMNEs perceptions of weak law enforcement in many African host countries. 
Model 2 in Table 8 tests Hypothesis 2 for acquisitions made inside Africa. 
Conversely to the result obtained for the full sample, the coefficient for the relationship 
between the dependent variable ownership and the independent variable knowledge 
distance is negative. Although the coefficient does not have statistical significance, the 
negative sign in this instance, being in opposition to the result obtained for the full 
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sample, suggest that higher legitimacy problems related with knowledge distance may 
arise when AfMNEs enter other African countries than when engage in a CBA outside 
the African continent. 
Despite the reasonably small sample size (N=130) Model 3 shows a positive 
coefficient and statistically significant (=5.329, p<0.05) for the variable target 
institutional development, thus confirming Hypothesis 3 in this subsample, and in line 
with the result obtained for the full sample. It suggests that the higher the level of 
institutional development in the host country, the lower the legitimacy problems 
AfMNEs must deal with, and the higher the ownership stake the firms are aiming at. 
When looking at Model 4 in Table 8, which tests the moderation effect between 
administrative distance and the target institutional development, the coefficient turns 
negative compared with the main sample, suggesting that the absence of institutional 
voids abroad lead AfMNEs’ managers to focus on the management of legitimacy in the 
host country since the foreign investors legal protection may be a minor concern in this 
instance. The coefficient does not have statistical significance. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is not 
supported within this subsample. 
Model 5 in Table 8 reaches a Nagelkerke R
2
 above 0.20 (Arslan & Larimo, 2011) 
and shows all the coefficients according to hypotheses 1 to 3, although none of them 
was able to achieve statistical significance. When considering in tandem, cross-country 
distances – regarding administrative distance and knowledge distance – and the level of 
institutional development of the host country, in what concerns to acquisitions made 
inside Africa, AfMNEs seem to resort to ownership strategies better aligned for the 
management of legitimacy abroad. 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Table 8. Logistic regression results (AfMNEs CBAs in Africa) 
 
Model 0 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
administrative distance 
  
 0.039 
     
-0.154 
 
-0.153 
knowledge distance 
    
-0.056 
     
-0.923 
target institutional development 
      
 5.329 **  3.840 
 
 3.872 
target inst. development x adm. distance 
       
-0.920 
 
-0.923 
  
           transaction value 0.003 
 
0.004 
 
0.004 
 
0.003 
 
0.005 
 
0.005 
degree of diversification -0.485 
 
-0.501 
 
-0.591 
 
-0.750 
 
-0.554 
 
-0.674 
experience in CBAs 0.089 * 0.099 * 0.084 
 
0.090 
 
0.093 
 
0.089 
experience in host region -0.278 
 
-0.346 
 
-0.197 
 
-0.134 
 
-0.194 
 
-0.115 
experience in host country 0.607 
 
0.632 
 
0.519 
 
0.318 
 
0.304 
 
0.206 
industry relatedness  0.087 
 
 0.011 
 
 0.003 
 
-0.177 
 
-0.211 
 
-0.321 
target is high-tech  0.540 
 
 0.647 
 
 0.537 
 
 0.558 
 
 0.788 
 
 0.795 
host country inflation -0.003 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003 
acquirer nation log GDP pc -0.588 
 
-0.291 
 
-0.581 
 
-1.225 
 
-0.985 
 
-0.957 
cultural distance -0.020 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.020 
 
-0.019 
geographic distance  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
            Nagelkerke R Square  0.169 
 
 0.181 
 
 0.173 
 
 0.218 
 
 0.263 
 
 0.267 
Chi-square 17.441 
 
18.679 
 
17.859 
 
22.889 
 
28.153 
 
28.635 
-2 log likelihood 158.321 
 
157.083 
 
157.903 
 
152.873 
 
147.609 
 
147.127 
N 130 
 
130 
 
130 
 
130 
 
130 
 
130 
            Dependent variable: Full ownership = 1 vs Partial ownership = 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 9 displays the coefficients for the subsample composed by the acquisitions 
exclusively made out of Africa. I expect that CBAs made out of Africa will present 
AfMNEs with more unfamiliar and developed institutional environments. In this 
instance, since the host countries are generally economically more developed than the 
AfMNE’s home country, I expect that the acquirer main concerns for gaining legitimacy 
abroad mostly relate to cross-country differences regarding administrative and 
knowledge dimensions. 
Model 1 in Table 9 tests Hypothesis 1. Also in this subsample the coefficient for 
the relationship between the independent variable administrative distance and the 
dependent variable ownership is positive and does not have statistical significance. 
Once again Hypothesis 1 failed to be supported. However, in this particular case, the 
value of the coefficient diminishes its magnitude compared to the main sample, or 
compared with the sample for acquisitions made in Africa as well. Thus, in acquisitions 
made out of Africa the administrative distance perceived by the managers seems to 
loose relevance for their ownership decisions. 
Model 2 in Table 9 shows a positive coefficient for the variable knowledge 
distance. Albeit the knowledge distance coefficient does not have statistical significance 
this result is aligned with Elango and Pattnaik (2011) view. These authors state that 
MNEs from emerging economies use CBAs in developed economies to acquire strategic 
resources and overcoming entry barriers in the host market, while reducing “restraints 
created by institutional and market conditions by their home markets” (Elango & 
Pattnaik, 2011, p. 463).  Partnerships are often used by firms seeking intangible 
resources and/or aiming at capturing opportunities (Meyer et al., 2009; Li et al., 2014). 
Therefore, since the CBAs in the database are biased towards acquisitions in more 
developed countries (202 out of 314, see Table 2), it is plausible that the positive 
relationship between ownership and knowledge distance may be related with AfMNEs 
being targeting at the host countries’ tangible resources and codified knowledge, while 
seeking to exploit opportunities at home. AfMNEs will likely have developed their 
absorptive capacities in order to transfer the acquired knowledge and know-how to their 
home countries and translate it into a strategic competitive advantage (Chen et al., 2012; 
Osabutey et al, 2014). The heterogeneity of capabilities (Sun, Peng, Ren and Yan, 2012) 
between AfMNEs might explain the coefficient’s absence of statistical significance. 
Model 3 in Table 9 shows a positive coefficient and statistically significant 
(=5.604, p<0.05) for the variable target institutional development, thus confirming 
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Hypothesis 3 in this subsample, and also in line with the result obtained for the full 
sample. It suggests that the higher the level of institutional development in the host 
country outside Africa, the lower the legitimacy hurdles presented abroad, and the 
higher the levels of equity control sought by AfMNEs. 
Model 4 in Table 9, which tests the moderation effect of the level of institutional 
development of the host country and cross-country administrative distance, exhibits a 
positive coefficient for the relationship between the moderator effect and the dependent 
variable ownership, suggesting that the absence of institutional voids abroad lead 
AfMNEs’ managers to focus on the exploitation of their endeavor without higher 
concerns regarding the management of legitimacy, even when sensing administrative 
differences between home and host countries. 
Model 5 in Table 9 also reaches a Nagelkerke R
2
 above 0.20 (Arslan & Larimo, 
2011) and shows a significant coefficient for the independent variable target 
institutional development (=6.621, p<0.05). Therefore, also in the subsample for CBAs 
made by AfMNEs out of Africa, when the host country presents more market friendly 
environments with fewer institutional voids, AfMNEs seem to resort to higher levels of 
ownership stakes and face less legitimacy concerns abroad. 
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Table 9. Logistic regression results (AfMNEs CBAs out of Africa) 
 
Model 0 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 administrative distance 
  
 0.008 
     
 0.005 
 
 0.004 
 knowledge distance 
    
0.019 
     
-0.025 
 target institutional development 
      
 5.604 **  5.858 **  6.621 ** 
target inst. development x adm. distance 
        
 0.130 
 
 0.119 
   
            transaction value 0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 degree of diversification -0.488 
 
-0.507 
 
-0.484 
 
-0.415 
 
-0.491 
 
-0.474 
 experience in CBAs 0.038 * 0.038 * 0.039 * 0.038 * 0.039 * 0.037 * 
experience in host region -1.339 ** -1.332 ** -1.316 ** -1.105 ** -1.089 * -1.095 * 
experience in host country 0.704 
 
0.723 
 
0.708 
 
0.626 
 
0.677 
 
0.659 
 industry relatedness  0.227 
 
 0.223 
 
 0.255 
 
 0.360 
 
 0.330 
 
 0.311 
 target is high-tech  0.092 
 
 0.083 
 
 0.048 
 
-0.090 
 
-0.129 
 
-0.088 
 host country inflation -0.122 ** -0.124 ** -0.112 ** -0.056 
 
-0.054 
 
-0.058 
 acquirer nation log GDP pc -0.513 
 
-0.487 
 
-0.521 
 
-0.763 
 
-0.634 
 
-0.697 
 cultural distance  0.012 
 
 0.012 
 
 0.012 
 
 0.010 
 
 0.011 
 
 0.009 
 geographic distance  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
             Nagelkerke R Square  0.199 
 
 0.200 
 
 0.201 
 
 0.235 
 
 0.239 
 
 0.241 
 Chi-square 28.790 ** 28.908 ** 29.051 ** 34.470 ** 35.183 ** 35.526 ** 
-2 log likelihood 210.205 
 
210.087 
 
209.944 
 
204.525 
 
203.811 
 
203.468 
 N 184 
 
184 
 
184 
 
184 
 
184 
 
184 
 
            
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.                       
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Because CBAs made by South African MNEs accounts for more than 50% of 
total sample (184 acquisitions out of 314), I also split the main sample into two more 
subsamples: one considering the CBAs performed by South Africa’s firms; and another 
encompassing CBAs performed by AfMNEs from home countries other than South 
Africa. There are two reasons to engage in the analysis of these two subsamples. First, 
South African MNEs enjoy the possibility of supporting their international expansion 
endeavors through a governmental agency that provides financial and technical 
assistance. Thus, the experience and international network relationships already 
established by this governmental agency may ease South African MNEs challenges for 
gaining legitimacy abroad, by acting in reducing uncertainties and sharing risks. 
Because non-South African AfMNEs do not seem to dispose of this type of 
governmental assistance at home these companies probably face higher difficulties for 
gaining legitimacy abroad. Second, the results of the main sample obtained in Table 7 
may be biased because of other South Africa’s specificities, such as higher levels of 
education or economic development compared with the majority of non-South African 
AfMNEs home countries. Therefore, it is important to analyze to what extent these 
home countries’ specificities influence the acquirer’s ownership strategies for achieving 
legitimacy abroad. 
Table 10 exhibits the results of logistic regression for the CBAs made by MNEs 
coming from South Africa. Although it was not possible to assess how often and to 
what extension South African MNEs require their governmental agency assistance 
when engaging in a CBA, I expect that South African MNEs will experience less 
difficulties for gaining legitimacy abroad compared with non-South African AfMNEs. 
Model 1 in Table 10, which tests Hypothesis 1 within this subsample, shows a 
positive coefficient for the relationship between administrative distance and ownership, 
in line with the result obtained in Table 6 for the full sample. It suggests that managers 
from South African firms opt more often for a full acquisition when cross-country 
administrative distance increases. Because this result has no statistical significance, 
caution needs are in place regarding the above interpretation.  
Model 2 in Table 10 tests Hypothesis 2 for acquisitions made by South African 
firms. The coefficient for the relationship between the dependent variable ownership 
and the independent variable knowledge distance is positive, and in line the result 
obtained for the main sample. Although the coefficient does not have statistical 
significance, the positive sign suggests that South African firms prefer full acquisitions 
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when engaging in a CBA into knowledge distant countries, which can be explained if 
South African firms are entering the foreign market aiming at codified knowledge 
(Kogut & Singh, 1988) and realizing fewer pressures regarding the achievement of 
legitimacy abroad (Lu et al., 2008). 
Model 3 in Table 10 analyzes Hypothesis 3. As in the previous regression analysis 
the model shows a positive coefficient and statistically significant (=3.872, p<0.01) for 
the variable target institutional development, thus confirming Hypothesis 3 in this 
subsample, and in line with the result obtained for the full sample. It confirms that the 
higher the level of institutional development in the host country, the lower the 
legitimacy problems South African MNEs face in the foreign country, and the higher 
the likelihood of pursuing a full ownership acquisition. 
Model 4 in Table 10 tests Hypothesis 4. The coefficient for the moderation effect 
between administrative distance and the target institutional development is negative and 
non-significant, similarly to what happened when considering the full sample. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4 cannot be supported within this subsample. 
Model 5 in Table 10 reaches a Nagelkerke R
2
 above 0.20 (Arslan & Larimo, 
2011) and only confirms statistically the Hypothesis 3, similarly to the results obtained 
for the main sample. This result suggests that the absence of institutional voids abroad 
pose fewer legitimacy problems for South African firms when incurring in their 
international expansion efforts, and that cross-country distances regarding 
administrative and knowledge dimensions might pose disparate legitimacy problems 
according to each firm idiosyncrasies. 
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Table 10. Logistic regression results (South African CBAs) 
 
Model 0 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 administrative distance 
  
0.001 
     
0.001 
 
0.001 
 knowledge distance 
    
0.046 
     
-0.002 
 target institutional development 
      
3.872 *** 3.945 *** 3.963 *** 
target inst. development x adm. distance 
        
-0.143 
 
-0.143 
   
            transaction value 0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 degree of diversification -0.409 
 
-0.412 
 
-0.374 
 
-0.543 
 
-0.476 
 
-0.478 
 experience in CBAs 0.028 
 
0.028 
 
0.030 * 0.029 
 
0.029 
 
0.029 
 experience in host region -0.656 * -0.656 * -0.648 * -0.396 
 
-0.416 
 
-0.415 
 experience in host country 0.433 
 
0.437 
 
0.454 
 
0.119 
 
0.073 
 
0.070 
 industry relatedness  0.089 
 
 0.087 
 
 0.167 
 
 0.109 
 
 0.112 
 
 0.110 
 target is high-tech  0.209 
 
 0.210 
 
 0.165 
 
 0.222 
 
 0.272 
 
 0.274 
 host country inflation -0.009 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.007 
 
 0.002 
 
 0.001 
 
 0.001 
 acquirer nation log GDP pc -0.570 
 
-0.562 
 
-0.539 
 
-0.934 
 
-0.852 
 
-0.854 
 cultural distance -0.005 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.004 
 geographic distance  0.000 ***  0.000 ***  0.000 **  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
                      
Nagelkerke R Square  0.139 
 
 0.139 
 
 0.149 
 
 0.203 
 
 0.210 
 
 0.210 
 Chi-square 34.446 *** 34.452 ** 37.007 *** 51.764 *** 53.707 *** 53.710 *** 
-2 log likelihood 397.584 
 
397.577 
 
395.022 
 
380.266 
 
378.222 
 
378.320 
 N 184 
 
184 
 
184 
 
184 
 
184 
 
184 
 
            
 Dependent variable: Full ownership = 1 vs Partial ownership = 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 11 exhibits the results of logistic regression for the CBAs made by 
AfMNEs from home countries other than South Africa. This subsample is mainly 
composed by AfMNEs coming from economically underdeveloped countries. It is likely 
that the companies of this subsample are facing the highest challenges regarding the 
achievement of legitimacy abroad and, therefore, it is important to analyze their 
ownership choices separately. 
Table 11 presents the first instance where the results show statistical significance 
for the coefficients of administrative distance, in Model 1, and knowledge distance, in 
Model 5.  
In Model 1, Table 11, the coefficient for administrative distance is positive and 
significant (=0.093, p<0.05). AfMNEs coming from non-South Africa engage in 
CBAs mainly in African host countries (65 cases out of 130) while South Africa firms 
mainly target at host countries located outside Africa (119 cases out of 184). According 
to La Porta et al. (1998) weak quality of law enforcement along with meager accounting 
standards induce investors to a response of ownership concentration. Hence, this result 
might be a consequence not only of the effects of the perceived administrative distance 
by AfMNEs’ managers, but also the effect of accrued institutional voids found in the 
host country. Although not statistically significant, the negative value found in Model 5 
for the coefficient of the moderation between administrative distance and target 
institutional development, coupled with the decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient 
for the predictor administrative distance, seems to reinforce this theoretical 
interpretation of the result obtained in Model 1 for the administrative distance 
coefficient. 
In Model 2, the coefficient for knowledge distance is negative, and in line with the 
hypothesized direction of the relationship between this predictor and the dependent 
variable ownership. Although not statistically significant, this result may indicate that 
cross-country knowledge distance poses some legitimacy hurdles for AfMNEs other 
than South African firms, inducing the acquirer firms to seek for partnerships in the host 
country. 
In Model 3, Table 11, once again the model shows a positive coefficient and 
statistically significant (=4.730, p<0.01) for the variable target institutional 
development, thus confirming Hypothesis 3 in this subsample, and in line with the result 
obtained for the full sample. Therefore, I found a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the absence of institutional voids abroad and the preference for 
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pursuing a full ownership by AfMNEs, confirming that more market friendly 
environments present fewer difficulties regarding the achievement of legitimacy in the 
host countries. 
Model 4, which tests Hypothesis 4, the moderator effect of target institutional 
development over administrative distance on the firms’ ownership stake choices, shows 
a positive and statistical significant sign for both predictor variables while failing to 
statistically confirm the negative sign of the moderation relationship. This result 
indicates that the effect of moderation may exist. Cumulatively, the coefficient for the 
moderation effect has opposite sign to those of the predictor variables, both predictors 
are statistically significant and the Nagelkerke R Square increases, outlining that this 
Model 4 is more powerful than previous ones for explaining the variance of the 
dependent variable ownership. Overall, this result suggests that AfMNEs other than 
South African firms seek higher ownership stakes when cross-country administrative 
distance increases and when the host country presents fewer institutional voids. 
Theoretically, the preference for higher ownership stakes when administrative distance 
increases might be explained by the effort of foreign investors to better protect 
themselves in unfamiliar regulatory settings (La Porta et al., 1998), while the preference 
for full ownership stakes in higher developed environments might be explained by 
fewer legitimacy hurdles for achieving legitimacy abroad in this instance. The negative 
sign for the moderation effect may indicate that cross-country administrative distance 
effect is attenuated by the host country institutional development, not only because of 
the opposition of the sign of the coefficient but also because the magnitude of the 
coefficient for the predictor administrative distance diminishes from Model 1 to Model 
4. 
Model 5 in Table 11 is the first instance of the post-hoc analyses where the 
coefficients for the cross-country knowledge distance and target institutional 
development are both statistically significant. The coefficient for the relationship 
between knowledge distance and ownership is negative and statistically significant    
(= -0.121, p<0.05) which gives support for Hypotheses 2 within this subsample. This 
result acquires more importance since the sample is relatively small, which adds more 
meaning to the role of cross-country knowledge differences for the management of 
legitimacy abroad by AfMNEs – other than those coming from South Africa. This result 
obtained for the full model gathers accrued importance because it reaches a Nagelkerke 
R Square of 0.404, meaning that this model explains the variation of the dependent 
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variable ownership nearly two times better than in previous samples. In practical terms, 
this result outlines that when target institutional development decreases and cross-
country knowledge distance increases non-South African AfMNEs show preference for 
entering foreign markets through partnerships in order to better manage legitimacy 
abroad. 
Besides, these results suggest that the effects of the realized institutional distance 
sensed by managers from non-South African AfMNEs is different from those that are 
perceived by the managers of South African acquirer firms. Indeed, South African 
MNEs enjoy the possibility of gathering support from a governmental agency, “The 
Industrial Development Corporation”, which, in their own web page words, “plays a 
catalytic role in promoting partnerships across industries and across borders”, and 
participate in jointly investment projects throughout Africa (Chen et al., 2016). Thus, 
the international experience and networks of this organization may contribute to a 
decrease in the perceived institutional distances of South African MNEs’ managers. 
Finally, it is worth noting a statistical significant result for the control variable 
target is high-tech. Considering the subsample presented in Table 11, the coefficient for 
the relationship between the predictor target is high-tech and the dependent variable 
ownership is positive and statistically significant in all cases, from Model 0 to Model 5. 
Elango et al. (2013, p. 4) state that CBA “that involve entry into high-technology 
industries are more likely to be partial acquisition relative to full acquisitions” mainly 
because of the existence of information asymmetry between the transaction parties. 
Nonetheless, these authors highlight that this relationship should be in the opposite 
direction when MNEs are entering unfamiliar institutional environments. Therefore, one 
possible explanation for this result may be that non-South African AfMNEs mainly 
needed to “protect their newly acquired technology in an unfamiliar institutional 
setting” (Elango et al., 2013, p. 13). 
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Table 11. Logistic regression results (non-South African CBAs) 
 
Model 0 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 administrative distance 
  
0.093 ** 
    
0.087 * 0.073 
 knowledge distance 
    
-0.035 
     
-0.121 * 
target institutional development 
      
4.730 *** 4.941 *** 6.365 *** 
target inst. development x adm. distance 
       
-0.045 
 
-0.130 
   
            transaction value 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 degree of diversification -0.578 
 
-1.114 
 
-0.675 
 
-0.993 
 
-1.506 
 
-1.820 
 experience in CBAs  0.044 
 
 0.023 
 
 0.053 
 
 0.008 
 
-0.014 
 
 0.004 
 experience in host region -1.774 ** -1.865 *** -1.797 *** -1.550 ** -1.630 ** -1.740 ** 
experience in host country 1.345 
 
1.503 
 
1.194 
 
1.241 
 
1.402 
 
0.963 
 industry relatedness  0.156 
 
-0.438 
 
0.034 
 
0.053 
 
-0.550 
 
-0.899 
 target is high-tech  1.892 **  2.197 **  1.973 **  2.390 ***  2.831 ***  3.263 *** 
host country inflation 0.035 
 
0.038 
 
0.034 
 
0.049 
 
0.060 
 
0.055 
 acquirer nation log GDP pc 0.867 
 
1.330 
 
0.894 
 
-0.098 
 
0.271 
 
-0.005 
 cultural distance -0.029 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.030 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.033 
 
-0.037 
 geographic distance  0.000 ***  0.000 ***  0.000 ***  0.000 
 
 0.000 
 
 0.000 
 year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
                      
Nagelkerke R Square  0.257 
 
 0.300 
 
 0.261 
 
 0.340 
 
 0.377 
 
 0.404 
 Chi-square 27.764 ** 33.000 ** 28.219 ** 38.183 *** 43.085 *** 46.767 *** 
-2 log likelihood 151.345 
 
146.109 
 
150.890 
 
140.926 
 
136.024 
 
132.342 
 N 130 
 
130 
 
130 
 
130 
 
130 
 
130 
 
            
 Dependent variable: Full ownership = 1 vs Partial ownership = 0. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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6. Discussion 
 
In this study I address the effects of disparate institutional contexts faced by 
MNEs in deciding the ownership choices in CBAs. Although prior literature has 
addressed the theme of ownership strategic choices in CBAs through the lens of 
institutional theory (e.g., Elango et al., 2013; Madhok, 1997; Chari and Chang, 2009; 
Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan & Xu, 2015; Ando, 2012; Kedia & Bilgili, 2015; Sun et 
al., 2012; Gaur & Lu, 2007; De Beule et al., 2014; La Porta et al., 1998) I am not aware 
of the existence of several studies integrating cross-national differences and legitimacy 
concerns to identify the MNE’s relevant institutional context and its impact on MNEs’ 
ownership strategies. 
For AfMNEs entering underdeveloped countries without a strong legitimating 
position, as it may be enjoyed by MNEs from advanced economies (Kostova et al., 
2008), overcoming legitimacy concerns will likely require a quite specific approach. 
Institutional voids, such as unclear regulatory frameworks, inexperienced bureaucracies, 
underdeveloped court systems, and institutional settings with corruption issues and 
weak property rights protection – increase transaction costs (Meyer, 2001; Chan et al., 
2008; Abotsi & Iyavarakul, 2015) and demand different capabilities to survive rather 
than those required by a developed institutional environment. These environments 
usually offer opportunities to take advantage of market imperfections but those potential 
gains can be offset by excessive costs of uncertainty and government arbitrariness 
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009). Furthermore, underdeveloped environments inhibit MNEs to 
properly adapt as the distance grows because there is a growing difficulty in 
understanding how to achieve legitimacy in the host country (Hernández & Nieto, 2015) 
and how to safeguard against private and public expropriation hazards in these settings 
(Delios & Henisz, 2000). Mainly, these host institutional settings require network-based 
capabilities (Ando 2012, Peng, 2003, Peng et al., 2009), where, to be successful, “who 
you know” becomes more important than “what you know” (White III et al., 2015). In 
this instance, this accrued need for legitimacy might induce AfMNEs to seek for 
partnerships abroad, and/or to rely more heavily in political ties, in order to enable the 
success of their investment in the foreign market. 
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Conversely, when entering host countries that are institutionally developed MNEs 
face strong pressures from the three institutional pillars (regulative, normative and 
cognitive) to engage in market-based impersonal exchange (Peng, 2003). Although 
AfMNEs may lack the capabilities to immediately compete on those markets, the 
acquired target is already legitimate and fully operating. However, AfMNE’s lack of 
capabilities to deal with a market based economy will likely pose critical legitimacy 
concerns. Their accrued legitimacy barriers might come from their inferiority regarding 
technology and know-how. This handicap poses both internal and external legitimacy 
problems. Internally, the success of the endeavor might be compromised due to 
integration difficulties between the AfMNE and its subsidiary. Nonetheless, AfMNEs 
may be able to manage this difficulty because of their specific institutional context. 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999, p. 75) pose that “the less legitimate local firms are in a 
particular institutional environment, the less challenge MNEs subunits will face in 
establishing legitimacy in that host environment”. Moreover, Kostova et al. (2008, p. 
999) highlight that when something “distinctive [and] appreciated by local constituents” 
is brought from abroad it is likely that local practices loose predominance. Hence, in 
this instance, home local pressures for isomorphism are weakening, or even excluded. 
Regarding concerns over the transfer of new processes and know-how from the 
subsidiary to the parent firm, it is likely that its acceptance at home will be good since it 
will enhance AfMNEs competitive advantage. Therefore, the integration between the 
African parent firm and its subsidiary will likely occur almost free of pressures for the 
perpetuation of the old fashion practices, remaining the difficulties for being accepted 
by the host country constituencies. 
Specifically, I have examined two dimensions regarding the deterrent effect of 
cross-national distance on the achievement of legitimacy by MNEs engaging in a CBA: 
administrative distance and knowledge distance. Both dimensions were considered 
under Berry et al.’s (2010) framework and gauged their combined effects with the level 
of institutional development of the host country. These dimensions follow the guidance 
provided by the literature which outlines: (1) the important role over a country’s 
economic development of both institutional development and factor market 
development (Hoskisson et al., 2013); and (2) the influence of the regulatory and 
technological differences on MNEs ability to achieve legitimacy abroad when entering a 
more advanced host country – in economic terms (Meyer et al., 2014). These two 
institutional dimensions for assessing cross-national distances seem to be particularly 
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relevant within the institutional context of the African continent because they pose 
several legitimacy challenges that influence AfMNEs ownership stake choices in their 
international expansion endeavors. 
The multitude of institutional idiosyncrasies among African countries enables a 
deeper understanding over how ownership stake choices change when different 
legitimacy needs emerge. Particularly, by using a multi-country analysis based in the 
African context I was able to achieve a wide diversity of institutional contexts. Africa 
presents a very special context since the legitimacy challenges faced by AfMNEs are 
magnified by their home countries institutional weaknesses. Furthermore, host countries 
might look at an AfMNE based on pejorative stereotypes, which hinder the African firm 
from achieving legitimacy abroad. Even inside the African continent, due to Africa’s 
internal diversity regarding both the regulatory framework across countries and the 
variety of colonial ties that are still in place, an AfMNE might face higher difficulties 
for gaining legitimacy in a host country inside their own continent than those required 
to a foreign firm coming from an economically advanced location.  Technological 
weaknesses pose another potential hurdle for achieving legitimacy when entering host 
countries located in advanced economies (Meyer et al., 2014). Thus, by resting the 
analysis in a wide diversity of home and host countries that present disparate 
institutional environments among themselves, this study outlines how managers adapt 
their ownership stake choices for enabling the AfMNEs acquiring legitimacy abroad. 
Overall, this study gives a number of contributions to the international business 
theory. In theoretical terms, I adopt an approach of integrating the elements of cross-
national distance and direction to assess the extension of legitimacy challenges that 
MNEs face abroad. When MNEs are setting up their ownership strategies abroad the 
development of institutions in the host country interacts with managers’ perceptions of 
institutional distance across countries. This interaction influences the ownership 
strategies that each MNE choses for gaining legitimacy abroad. 
In empirical terms, this study outlines how institutional contexts are firm specific 
and pose different challenges according to the host country under examination. An 
element of novelty is added by combining the empirical dimensions of administrative 
and knowledge distances with the level of institutional development of the host country. 
Furthermore, it consolidates the validity of previous theories in the African context 
while highlighting the importance of legitimacy when examining a CBA endeavor.  
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The results indicate that firms adapt their ownership decisions according to the 
institutional context at hand but this response encompasses the evaluation of the 
external environment conditions in relation to each firm specific needs and capabilities. 
This observation confirms previous research. The literature emphasizes the role of firms 
unique identity where it is stated that cross-country distance perceptions impact 
differently their strategic choices according to their own firm specific advantages (FSA) 
(Rugman et al., 2011), experience (Lebedev et al., 2015; Swoboda et al., 2015; Elango 
et al., 2013; Arslan & Larimo, 2011; Dow & Larimo, 2011, 2009; Gaur & Lu, 2007; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 2009, 1977), and capabilities (Ferreira et al., 2011; Teece et al., 
1997). When drawing strategic decisions regarding MNEs international expansion, the 
need to consider institutional contexts, comprehending home and host countries 
idiosyncrasies (Hoskisson et al., 2013), is further extended by the literature in the 
realms of uncertainty management (Hernández & Nieto, 2015; Chan et al., 2008; 
Murtha & Lenway, 1994), opportunity capture (Li et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2012) and 
FSA exploitation (Rugman et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2008). Thus, the presence or 
absence of institutional voids in combination with other international business 
deterrents at the institutional domain – such as those at the regulative, normative and 
cognitive levels – constitutes the relevant institutional context when a MNE is 
embracing its strategic decision-making process. 
Results suggest that the absence of institutional voids, which is provided by 
higher levels of institutional development in the host country, is positively related with 
higher ownership stakes. Moreover, results show that this preference seems to be 
somewhat independent of firm idiosyncrasies and, therefore, should be a generalizable 
conclusion to MNEs other than African ones.  
Results also suggest that cross-national distance concerns are somehow related to 
firm specific aspects, outlined in this study by the support of Hypotheses 2 only for 
CBAs made by African home countries other than South Africa. This result also 
suggests that cross-national distance deterrents acquire higher preponderance when the 
presence of institutional voids increases in the host country.  
Results did not provide support for the hypothesized relationship of the existence 
of a moderator effect of the level of host country institutional development over 
institutional distance considerations in AfMNEs’ ownership decisions. This result 
seems to magnify the separate natures between the concepts of cross-national distance 
and legitimacy. In fact previous research has already shown that cross-national distance 
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is MNE centered and its effects vary according to each firm’s idiosyncrasies, such as 
international experience or other FSA (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Dow & Larimo, 
2009, 2011; Rugman et al., 2011). The achievement of legitimacy, in turn, is dependent 
on host country’s evaluation made by the relevant legitimating actors (Suchman, 1995; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova et al., 2008). Although higher cross-national distance 
hinders MNEs’ legitimacy achievement in the host country (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) it 
is not clear to what extent and under what circumstances this difficulty poses a strategic 
restriction to MNEs’ operations. In this regard, Kostova et al. (2008) and Suchman 
(1995) pose that MNEs have an option to undertake legitimating strategic actions in the 
host country. Moreover, internal legitimacy concerns (being consistent within the 
MNE’s system, harmonizing external and internal isomorphic pressures in home and 
host countries) are dependent on the MNE’s international expansion strategy because 
pursuing a multidomestic strategy – where the company mainly competes locally in 
many world locations – is different from pursuing a global strategy – where the 
company competes internationally through the integration of business processes 
originated in separated countries (Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Harzing, 2002). Hernández and 
Nieto (2015) stand that a higher level of regulative development prompts firms to easily 
obtain legitimacy abroad and that then firms will resort to institutional distance 
considerations, using the efficiency criteria under the transaction costs approach. 
Therefore, although increasing cross-country differences instances will likely lead to 
higher difficulties obtaining legitimacy, increasing the easiness of obtaining legitimacy 
does not seem to have a direct and proportional impact on diminishing MNEs’ 
perceptions over cross-country distance. Nonetheless the results evidence that there are 
institutionally distant countries that lead MNEs to higher ownership stake choices. 
Notably, despite the huge institutional distance between AfMNEs home countries 
and their legitimating host countries located in developed economies, AfMNEs opt 
preferably for a full acquisition when engaging in a CBA into these locations. Albeit 
these instances present AfMNEs with majored legitimacy challenges due to their 
extensive problems regarding economic, political and corruption issues at home, results 
evidence that the absence of institutional voids abroad induces the acquirer firms to opt 
for higher levels of equity control. This response likely buttresses AfMNEs for gaining 
legitimacy abroad since the establishment of partnerships abroad might be jeopardized 
by prejudice and distrust among the host countries’ agents towards the acquirer firms.   
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6.1 Limitations and future research avenues 
This study has a number of limitations worth noting. First, AfMNEs international 
orientation was not controlled for. Although I am aware of the importance of 
ethnocentric, polycentric or geocentric strategies for MNEs to achieve legitimacy 
(Harzing, 2002), it was not possible to control for this effect given the use of secondary 
data. Future research may overcome this limitation by grouping the acquirer firms under 
examination according to their international orientation because both internal and 
external legitimacy are affected by this strategic international orientation of the firm. 
Such research is important because it will extend our understanding over the interaction 
between organizations and institutions while increasing the accuracy of the theory to 
explain managerial practice regarding ownership stake choices. 
Second, different motives to engage in a CBA can lead to different acquirer 
strategic ownership behaviors since, for instance, accessing new markets and 
distribution channels may require different strategies than entering a foreign country for 
accessing new technologies and know-how, whilst posing different legitimacy 
challenges in the host country (Meyer et al., 2014). This work did not control for 
MNEs’ motives to embrace a CBA. The interplay between firms’ motives and 
capabilities provides a set of restrictions for engaging in CBA endeavors while also 
conditioning the range of relevant institutional contexts. Meyer (2015) enumerates the 
strategic motives for MNEs to engage in FDI operations as follows: market seeking, 
efficiency seeking, natural resource seeking, and strategic asset seeking. Each motive 
poses different legitimacy needs and offers a range of strategies from which MNEs must 
opt for. Therefore, these starting conditions demand further research. This investigation 
will enhance our understanding about how the complex relationship between legitimacy 
and MNEs’ motives for engaging in a CBA influences MNEs’ ownership strategies. 
Third, this study did not control for the existence of legitimacy spillover effects 
related with possible prior assumptions laying in the minds of host countries 
constituencies regarding a given AfMNE.  Kostova and Zaheer (1999, p. 75) state that 
“the legitimacy of a foreign subsidiary may be judged based on the legitimacy of all 
subsidiaries of that MNE or of all subsidiaries of the same home country in that host 
country”. The legitimacy spillover effect can be either positive or negative, and the 
authors posit that it is particularly relevant for MNEs. For example, it is quite likely that 
a host firm would try to avoid a partnership with an African company due to prior 
illegitimate procedures made by other African firm as seen by the host country 
65 
 
legitimating actors. This effect was not controlled for. By controlling the host country 
propensity to engage in international business relationships with a homogeneous group 
of MNEs will enhance our knowledge about the appropriateness of ownership strategies 
under the presence or absence of prior stereotypes towards the acquirer firms. 
Fourth, this study did not control for the existence of psychic distance stimuli 
dimensions, such as religion, form of government or ethnic background (Dow & 
Karunaratna, 2006) which may exacerbate legitimacy challenges that AfMNEs face 
abroad. These specific cross-country distance effects pose hurdles for the achievement 
of legitimacy by AfMNEs not only because of the colonial past of the whole continent 
but also because Africa is being built upon a wide variety of ethnicities, often hostile 
among themselves. Therefore, controlling for these cross-country effects on AfMNEs 
ability to gain legitimacy abroad may also enhance our understanding over how 
ownership strategies are adapted accordingly. 
Finally, although the size of the acquirer firm may impact its ownership stake 
choices (Chari & Chang, 2009) this study does not distinguish between small and large 
firms. The access to resources, the establishment of political ties, or the embeddedness 
in network membership can all be affected by firm’s dimension, and impact both 
managers’ cross-country distance perceptions and firms’ legitimacy needs and paths. 
Future research needs to deeper investigate the impact in AfMNEs strategic choices 
resulting from the interaction between the range of cross-national differences and the 
level of institutional development of the host country, while assessing for firm size. 
Berry et al. (2010) provide nine different institutional dimensions for measuring cross-
country differences. Considering the international business subject, a complete 
understanding of the institutional effects over MNEs strategic choices seems to require 
the integration of the concepts of legitimacy and institutional distance and relate them 
with particular firm idiosyncrasies, namely the size of the acquirer company. 
  
6.2 Managerial implications 
This study has important implications for organizations and managerial practice. 
To begin with, managers should not exaggerate cross-country distance perceptions 
because it may “lead managers to forego profitable business opportunities” (Håkanson 
& Ambos, 2010, p. 195). This opportunity cost might be quite substantial if the manager 
focuses exclusively in cross-country distance dimensions while disregarding the 
possibility of effortlessly obtaining legitimacy when entering a foreign market.  
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This study also outlines that the level of institutional development in the host 
country is an important determinant for MNEs ownership stake choices. Two practical 
consequences emerge. First, because cross-country distance perception is somehow firm 
specific, managers should carefully analyze the institutional context before mimicking 
other foreign firms’ behavior in a given foreign market. Second, the evaluation of the 
value of a possible CBA depends on the available strategies for the MNE, such as the 
ownership stake choice appropriate for the endeavor. Hence, the level of institutional 
development of the host country becomes crucial to assess the potential value of a CBA. 
Managers should examine carefully the appropriateness of their own previous 
strategies eventually used in prior CBAs because different institutional contexts may 
lead to a different set of effective strategies. Thus it is advisable to avoid the impulsive 
and convenient enforcement of personal strategic preferences when engaging in the 
CBA process. A preference for a full ownership stake might be suitable for a given 
institutional context, whilst a partial ownership stake might be better for successfully 
engage in a CBA in another institutional setting. Ultimately, this study alerts managers 
for integrating both cross-country distance and legitimacy examinations when 
performing their due diligence efforts because it can help their effectiveness dealing 
abroad with the market, potential partners and competition. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This study evidences that the general theoretical notion that higher cross-national 
distance instances lead to lower equity control choices only applies in a narrow 
situational institutional context and does not cover all legitimating factors MNEs need 
to consider for successfully drawing their international business strategies. 
AfMNEs’ ownership stake choices are definitely affected by the different 
institutional contexts firms are faced with. The propensity for pursuing a full ownership 
acquisition is enhanced by the level of institutional development of the host country. 
However, cross-country distance perceptions and relevance are firm specific, and 
ownership stake choices must adjust accordingly. Nonetheless, regardless of firm 
idiosyncrasies, the effects of unfamiliar environments over AfMNEs are magnified in 
the presence of institutional voids in the host country. 
This study rests on the assumption that each foreign firm face specific institutional 
pressures abroad and that these pressures may differ from firm to firm. The literature 
over institutional theory highlights the challenges that gaining legitimacy abroad 
presents to every MNE. Ownership strategies help MNEs deal with their legitimating 
audiences, both abroad and internally, and need to be adjusted according to each 
acquirer firm’s idiosyncrasies (Meyer et al., 2014; Kostova et al., 2008). 
Herein, and regarding ownership stake choices in a CBA, this study outlines that 
cross-national distance and legitimacy need to be considered in tandem when MNEs are 
setting up their strategies. “Institutional-based view on business strategy focuses on the 
dynamic interaction between institutions and organization, and considers strategic 
choices as the outcome of such interaction” (Peng, 2002, p. 253). Strategic choices are 
dependent on MNE managers’ perceptions regarding cross-country distance issues and 
legitimacy concerns (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Shenkar et al., 2008; Dikova, 2009; 
Sousa & Lages, 2011). Also, the African CBA context seems to step up this liaison by 
providing a heterogeneity of institutional contexts either in what concerns cross-national 
differences and when considering the level of institutional development in the host 
country.  
It is worth remembering the argument that AfMNEs are likely to face greater 
difficulties to achieve legitimacy abroad than those presented to MNEs from more 
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developed origins. One major concern highlighted in the literature regarding the 
legitimacy problem is the mutual need that the firm and its legitimating environment 
have for gathering information to address the processes of interpretation, evaluation and 
understanding each other (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). This accrued effort for 
successfully obtaining legitimacy abroad is higher for AfMNEs even when comparing 
with other non-African countries coming from emerging economies. 
Supported by the differences between the chosen ownership strategies of South 
African MNEs and non-South African AfMNEs, results strongly suggest that 
governmental and supranational organizations can play an important role assisting 
AfMNEs gaining legitimacy abroad and reducing the managers’ perception of cross-
country institutional distances. These organizations may complement the important role 
of cross-national trade agreements to facilitate the achievement of legitimacy, which has 
been previously outlined by the literature (Brewer, 2007). 
Furthermore, this study highlights that gaining legitimacy abroad presents a 
crucial challenge for the success of any MNE engaging in a CBA. Ownership strategies 
can be a useful tool enabling MNEs coming from a priori illegitimated locations to 
succeed in their international endeavors. However, it is worth mentioning that the 
appropriate ownership strategy is dependent on the combination of firm specificities 
with the relevant institutional context. Gaining legitimacy abroad may require specific 
capabilities, such as the MNEs’ proficiency developing political ties and/or network 
relationships, but the need and effectiveness of these capabilities is often linked to the 
level of institutional development in the host country.  
I conclude that the relevant institutional context is composed by the existence of 
home and host country institutional voids in combination with other international 
business deterrents at the realm of institutional theory, such as factors of cross-national 
differences. The literature outlines the scope for MNEs capabilities to be effective when 
dealing with strong or weak institutional environments for achieving legitimacy abroad 
(Estrin et al., 2016; Peng, 2003). Research also highlights the effects of cross-national 
distance on MNEs decision-making process (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009; Dow & 
Karunaratna, 2006; Brewer, 2007; Håkanson & Ambos, 2010; Swoboda et al., 2015; 
Berry et al., 2010) and legitimacy achievement (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Thus, it is 
important to understand their combined effects in order to draw effective strategies for 
coping with environmental challenges. Regardless how far the host country might be, in 
institutional terms, MNEs coming from underdeveloped economies and facing 
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pejorative stereotypes abroad still can delineate a successful strategy for gaining 
legitimacy in the host country. 
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